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De-confining borders: towards a politics of freedom of movement in the time of the pandemic

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ABSTRACT
This article, primarily focused on Europe, charts some of the momentous transformations in bordering practices, migration and global mobility that have been sparked by the new coronavirus pandemic. In a first part it argues that since the onset of the pandemic, the enduring ‘global mobility apartheid’ which uses citizenship and visa restrictions to police the differential access to mobility founded on race and class, has been supplemented by a fluctuating ‘sanitary apartheid’, seeking to separate populations designated as at risk of Covid-19 infection from those designated as Covid-free. While these logics are distinct, where states have conflated them, we have seen eruptive and mutating border violence. In a second more normative part the article seeks to rethink the demand for freedom of movement in the context of the pandemic, arguing that allowing migrants who today are illegalised to move in safe and legal ways is also the condition to implement sanitary measures to protect the health of migrants and sedentary populations alike. Adopting a mobility justice approach, the article also argues that the excessive mobility of the privileged through air travel that has been a major factor in spreading the virus and contributes to ecological destruction should be limited. Ultimately this article calls for re-thinking the politics of (im)mobility in the context of the pandemic as part of the process of transformation towards a more just and sustainable world.

Introduction

Early on in the Covid-19 pandemic, Bridget Anderson captured the highly uneven and contradictory global mobility entanglements that have been revealed by the spread of the new coronavirus and the dramatic responses and effects it triggered: ‘the multiple intersections of (im)mobilities of capital, of food, of humans, of animals, of the microbiological have produced the contemporary situation where the “cure”, it seems, is human immobility’ (Anderson 2020). Capital’s tendency to expand and tear down any limits that stand in the way of accumulation (Harvey 2001), including those of ecosystems, has led to the unleashing of new viruses – including probably the new coronavirus (Wallace 2020). The global web of transport infrastructures enabling human mobility for business, tourism and migration has in turn served as the conduit through which this new virus spread at lightning speed. Having allowed the virus to spread beyond control, nearly all countries have implemented stringent confinement measures within their territories, drastically limiting movement within cities and regions so as to prevent the physical interaction between humans through which contamination occurs. States have also imposed strict limitations on international travel across their...
borders, seeking to confine their countries as a whole from a virus framed as an exterior threat. Fear of the invasive pathogen has been coupled with the fear of ‘invasive’ people (Ticktin 2017) – racialised subjects already present within countries or those seeking to reach them such as refugees and migrants – leading to heightened border violence but also hardening social boundaries within daily social interactions. The othered and the dispossessed – who had least access to the webs of mobility infrastructures wove across the globe – have paid the heaviest price for stringent restrictions on internal and international mobility. At the same time, Anderson underlines, the scapegoating of migrants diverts attention from these entangled geographies, and makes us unable to transform them in a way that might durably prevent the emergence of deadly pathogens in the future (Anderson 2020).

In the face of these urgent and dizzying developments, which have both emerged from intersecting global motilities and profoundly transformed them in turn (if selectively and unequally), this article charts in a first part some of the momentous transformations in local and international mobility and bordering practices across the European continent and at its edges. In particular, relying on a range of fragmentary examples, I seek to decipher the ways in which pre-pandemic bordering practices and hierarchies of (im)mobility between European citizens and migrants from the global South have been transformed in the wake of the pandemic, and how the modalities of border violence have mutated. In a second more normative part, I argue that in the context of the pandemic the demand for universal freedom of movement is more important than ever (Mezzadra and Stier 2020), but that it must be significantly re-thought in light of unequal and contradictory (im)mobility entanglements that the pandemic has brought to the fore. Adopting a mobility justice approach (Sheller 2018), I argue that while it is urgent to enable legal migration and mobility ‘for those who move because they must’, since this is the condition to protect their rights and health, we should also challenge the right of the privileged to fly ‘across borders near and far simply because they can’ (Reynolds 2020, 347), an excessive mobility that has contributed to spreading the new coronavirus and ecological destruction alike.

1. Pandemic transformations of the geographies of borders and (im)mobility

**Controlling the pandemic, sealing borders**

Throughout history, human mobility has repeatedly been singled out as a major factor in the spreading of infectious diseases. Historians show us that the plague or cholera epidemics spread along sinuous paths, through the movement of armies, traders, pilgrims, and then proliferated within Europe as a result of overcrowded cities and work places as well as lack of sanitation (Huber 2006; Morse 2001). The global spread of the new coronavirus has been enabled today by a dense network of mobility infrastructures, in particular of global air travel. As in the past, however, it is also particular mobile subjects – racialized, classed, gendered – that have been disproportionately targeted by popular resentment and state sanctions alike (Amnesty International 2020). In early March 2020, after Hungary detected nine cases of infection among Iranians (mostly university scholarship-holders), Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared: ‘Our experience is that primarily foreigners brought in the disease, and that it is spreading among foreigners’. He was quick to seize upon these cases to conflate the declared ‘war on the pandemic’ with the war on migration he and other European states have been waging for years, stating: ‘We are fighting a two-front war, one front is called migration, and the other one belongs to the coronavirus, there is a logical connection between the two, as both spread with movement’ (AFP 2020). Orban’s statement, which, as we will see, is far from exceptional either in Europe or in the rest of the world (Trilling 2020), exemplifies the articulation of the containment of an invasive pathogen, with the containment of certain kinds of ‘invasive’ people (Ticktin 2017). While the simple equation (racialised) migration = virus is absurd, it would be just as absurd to deny the impact of human mobility across different scales on the spread of the virus. After all, as one epidemiologist put it: ‘it is not the virus that moves, but people’ (Pittet 2020).
The analysis of epidemiologists suggests that it is less the precarious movement of illegalised migrants who are denied access to safe transport infrastructures that contributed to the global spread of the virus than the mobility of privileged travellers – those with the right passport and the right amount of cash – flying across global transport hubs (Linka et al. 2020; Russell et al. 2020). Human movement in and of itself does not spread the virus as long as it does not involve close proximity and contact in confined spaces with people who may be infected. However, the collective transport infrastructures that organise our mobility at present such as buses, metros, trains, and aircrafts have been shaped by the imperative of carrying the highest number of people in the smallest possible space. This makes it very difficult for travellers to avoid physical proximity in the course of their mobility, which is conducive to spreading the virus. In addition, mobility infrastructures often converge in hubs that concentrate people in confined space before their paths branch off again, potentially spreading the virus to multiple locations. This was the case, for example, in the Austrian ski resort of Ischgl where in early March tourists from across Europe and beyond converged, contracted the virus as a result of contact with a Covid-19 cluster in the resort before returning to their home countries and spreading it further (Correa-Martinez et al. 2020). The modelling of the early spread of the virus by Linka and his colleagues demonstrates that the outbreak ‘closely followed global mobility patters of air passenger travel’ (Linka, et al. 2020, 5). The authors note that after being brought to several European countries from China, ‘the novel coronavirus spread rapidly via the strongest network connections to Germany, Spain, and France, while slowly reaching the less connected countries, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although air travel is certainly not the only determinant of the outbreak dynamics, our findings indicate that mobility is a strong contributor to the global spreading of COVID-19’ (Linka et al. 2020). While high connectivity has long been a marker of power and privilege within a highly uneven world order, it had now become a source of increased vulnerability (Amilhat-Szary 2020).

While the first cases of Covid-19 in Europe were detected in early January 2020 (Spiteri et al. 2020), most states only implemented widespread confinement measures within and at the borders of their countries in mid-March. The virus was thus allowed to spread at great speed across the EU, overwhelming national health systems – particularly where these had been diminished by years of imposition of neoliberal management logics and cuts to their budgets (Spiteri et al. 2020; Wallace, Liebman; Wallace et al. 2020). On March 13, the WHO declared Europe ‘the epicentre’ of the coronavirus pandemic with more reported cases and deaths than the rest of the world combined. After failing to offer early and united responses within and beyond Europe, EU states scrambled late and national(ist) ones. As Josef Borocz summarises, ‘each member state turned inward, in almost complete unison’. Europe was ‘carved up into twenty-seven “national” fortresses, ostensibly to “flatten” the national curves of coronavirus infections’ (Borocz 2020). Lockdown policies involving varying degrees of constraint confined most people in Europe to their homes, a space which, while representing an imaginary of security for some, is highly problematic for other segments of our societies – such as the homeless or women for whom the home represents a space of domestic violence (Bagnato 2020). The little movement we have been able to exercise within our cities has been channelled by lines of bright colours that have proliferated, on the floor in shops, for example, in the name of ‘physical distancing’.

New lines of control have also proliferated at the extremities of states, as one after the other they sealed their national borders.1 On 16 March 2020, the European Union as a whole announced the closure of all its external borders to non-citizens, confining the continent itself (European Commission 2020a). On March 26 the EU celebrated a bleak 25th anniversary of the Schengen Agreement that guarantees unrestricted movement for EU citizens between member states while all external and most internal borders of the EU closed. By then, the average passenger air travel to and in the EU had been cut in half, falling even further to −88% in relation to the previous year (Eurocontrol 2020). In short, as Frontex, the European border agency, summarizes, what has ensued within the EU ‘goes well beyond the reintroduction of border controls within the Schengen area.
Rather it constitutes a *closing down of the borders* to whole groups of travellers, in some cases even Union citizens’ (Frontex 2020).

If the relation between global mobility and the spreading of the virus is recognised, the closing of borders to prevent the spreading of a pandemic is a highly contested measure among epidemiologists (Flahault and Valleron 1990). The WHO has advised against travel restrictions with the exception of very specific circumstances (WHO 2020) and Meier and his colleagues have argued that these violate international law (Meier, Habibi and Yang 2020). Generally, limitations on travel are considered a double-edged sword that should be wielded carefully by weighing positive and negative effects, and always as part of a broader range of measures (Chinazzi et al. 2020). Crucially, the consensus among experts that the EU agencies such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and Frontex acknowledge, is that drastic lockdown of borders can only be effective if they are implemented *early* on, *before* a virus has been introduced into the population. This means that while the swift closing of borders across the African continent appears to have contributed to delaying the initial spread of the virus (Petit and Robin 2020), because in Europe these measures were introduced *after* the continent had become the epicentre of the pandemic, they had limited effect (Linka et al. 2020). Border closures in Europe and elsewhere have mostly served a *performative* function, allowing states to demonstrate their resolve through the spectacular exercise of their sovereign power, even as the spread of the virus demonstrated their weaknesses and failures at so many other levels (Brown 2020) (Sharma 2020). If border closures in Europe have had a limited impact on slowing the spread of the pandemic, as we will now see, they had a major impact in terms of spreading border violence.

**The differential impact of border closures**

If the term ‘pandemic’ etymologically refers to a disease affecting ‘all people’, it quickly became clear that despite the new coronavirus spreading globally it would not affect us all in the same ways. State policies deployed in response to the pandemic have exacerbated existing social boundaries, inequalities and conflicts, and exposed the different segments that compose our societies to differential degrees of vulnerability (Balibar 2020). This is true of the policies of confinement applied by states across the scales of cities and regions within their territories, as well as limitations on international travel imposed at their borders through which they have sought to confine their countries as a whole.³

The impact these stringent limitations on international travel had on people’s lives has varied greatly and has been highly dependent on the position within global hierarchies of mobility prior to the pandemic, which must be evoked briefly. A range of scholars have described the highly uneven allocation by states of the right to move across borders. Stefan Mau and his colleagues, for example, have analysed the evolution of the geography of visa-waivers over time, demonstrating that while citizens of OECD countries and rich countries have gained mobility rights over the last 50 years, these have stagnated or even diminished in other regions, in particular for citizens from African countries, leading to a ‘global mobility divide’ (Mau et. al 2015). While visa policies are usually couched in neutral technical terms, the geography of inclusion and exclusion that has thus emerged in effect uses the category of citizenship to allocate differentially the right to move to populations of the global North and South (Passport Index 2020). These divisions in turn broadly map onto a global geography of race and class, which further increases the polarisation of the actual access to mobility infrastructures. As a result, we see radically diverging experiences of mobility, and ‘some people roam the globe like masters, others like slaves’ (Hage 2016, 44). Etienne Balibar has long described these tendencies as leading to the formation of a form of ‘global apartheid’, referring to the South African regime to underline the hierarchical logic of *separation* at work on a *global scale*, generating highly unequal (im)mobilities, and shaping in turn enduring inequalities of status and conditions *within* societies (Balibar 2004; van Houtum 2010).
This process is particularly visible concerning the EU, where the progressive institution of an area of freedom of movement for European citizens since the early 1990s with its own internal hierarchies (Engbersen et al. 2017; Yildiz and De Genova 2018) has reinforced the exclusion of citizens of the global South and pushed control towards the EU’s external borders (Kasperek 2016). While class selection is formally expressed in regulations, for example via the types of employment as well as financial resources that are necessary for non-European citizens to access the EU, the category or race is far more elusive (Erel et al. 2016). Race has clearly shaped the migration regimes of European states in the wake of decolonisation, as the selective recruitment of former colonized subjects gave way to progressive closure to their mobility (Castles et al. 2013: 109–115). This process occurred in tandem with the emergence of the European Union and the institution of freedom of movement for European citizens (Vigneswaran 2019). However, in the course of the Europeanisation of migration policies, explicit traces of racial categorisation were replaced with neutral and technical terms even as the hierarchies of rights founded on racial categories have been perpetuated and exacerbated (Paoli 2015; Sandoz 2019, 59–60; Casas-Cortés and Cobarrubias 2019). Race has thus become a ‘vanishing mediator’ (Jameson 1973), which despite having been erased continues to shape the harsh reality of exclusionary bordering policies and practices that disproportionately target racialised subjects (Garner 2007) – as looking at the illegalised passengers of any boat crossing the sea easily reveals. The persistence of boat migration despite the EU’s exclusionary policies points to the fact that populations of the global South are not the passive recipients of this regime of differential (im)mobility. They actively contest it by seizing their freedom to move despite state policies that deny them their right to move and access to safe transport infrastructures. As a result, an enduring ‘mobility conflict’ (Heller and Pezzani 2018) has emerged between migrants from the global South and EU states, that crystallizes most starkly along particular border zones, such as the Mediterranean, leading to large-scale border deaths. Illegalized migrants who succeed in arriving safely on EU shores face irregular or precarious statuses, which negatively affect their labour conditions as well as their access to social and political rights.

In relation to this enduring hierarchy of mobility to and in the EU, the response of states to the pandemic have had ambivalent effects. On the one hand, one can see these blanket restrictions on travel as having introduced a measure of equality. After all, since March this year, migrants from the global South have not been alone in being targeted by restrictions. EU citizens, who normally benefit from the freedom to move within the EU and face few restrictions in their travel across the globe, have been getting a taste of the unfreedom experienced by those at the bottom of the global mobility hierarchy (Lazreg and Garneau 2020). From across the Mediterranean and the world’s oceans, the images some may have grown accustomed to of stranded migrants unable to disembark from the boats that rescued them have been mirrored by the images of the privileged passengers of cruise ships prevented for coming ashore for weeks after Covid-19 outbreaks were declared – while their far-less privileged crews have remained stuck on ships for months after (Khalili 2020; Kaji 2020). However, beyond this appearance of equality in the face of nearly generalised border closure, a far greater measure of inequality has persisted. As Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary (2020) has convincingly argued, we have seen a temporary reversal in the hierarchies of (im)mobility. The very privileged classes who have benefitted the most from global mobility are those which, as a result of their type of employment or financial resources, have been the most able to stay immobile during the pandemic, protecting themselves within the confines of their homes. This, however is precisely not a luxury illegalised migrants seeking to reach the EU could afford, since these exiles have often lost their homes and the very possibility of returning to their homelands.

Furthermore, while the EU Commission’s statement on the application of ‘temporary travel restrictions’ contained a limited number of exceptions, including concerning ‘persons in need of international protection or for other humanitarian reasons’, these have not been used by states to keep pathways open (European Commission 2020a). Instead, several EU states seized upon the occasion of the ‘war against the virus’ to legitimize and intensify the war against migrants they had
been waging for years (Migreurop 2020). This has been particularly the case along the EU’s external borders, which Frontex, the EU’s border agency, has framed in a May statement as key, arguing that ‘if we cannot control the external borders, we cannot control the spread of pandemics in Europe’ (Frontex 2020). Across the ever shifting Balkan routes, migrants have faced for several years conditions of extreme precarity that have been amplified by the virus and states’ responses to it. The Border Violence Monitoring Network notes that borders and migrant camps were further militarised in the wake of the pandemic, and that as a result ‘inequality has been sharpened for transit communities, further limiting access to asylum, health-care, adequate accommodation, and safety from brutal collective expulsions’ (BVMN 2020, 2). Border violence has also been exacerbated and mutated as well along the Mediterranean frontier, the area that has been the focus of my research within the Forensic Oceanography project over the last 10 years.  

The Mediterranean constitutes a fault-line of the world system, where profound inequality and racialised difference overlap, and has long been the main frontline of the mobility conflict opposing the EU’s restrictive policies to the desires and movements of migrants from the global South. While European states and agencies have deployed militarized means of border control to police the movements of illegalized migrants across the sea, it is generally not the bullets of border guards that inflict harm onto their bodies. Rather policies that illegalise migrants’ journeys force them to resort to smugglers and embark on overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels. While this leads to frequent situations of distress at sea, the reluctance of European states to rescue migrants results in them frequently being abandoned to the winds and currents. At work across the maritime frontier then is predominantly a form of indirect violence, inflicted by policies and operations that turn the sea into a hostile environment for migrants: more than 40,000 deaths have been documented at the EU’s borders over the last 30 years, the majority from drowning (United 2020). The Mediterranean deathscape exemplified the way at the external edges of its compartments, the global mobility apartheid structurally leads to the ‘premature death’ for classed and racialised migrants, who, like the racialised victims of police violence within states, can’t breathe (Gilmore Wilson 2007). The mechanisms operating this form of indirect violence at and through the sea have mutated over the last months, with states’ responses to the pandemic heightening already existing trends.  

In the eastern Mediterranean, the Covid-19 related dynamics have been inextricably intertwined with the exclusionary policies that had been initiated in 2019 by the new right-wing Greek government, and the tensions that have escalated between Greece and Turkey since early 2020. On the 28 of February 2020 already, just after the first cases of Covid-19 were detected among Greek citizens returning from Italy, Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis warned that ‘the country can no longer accept more illegal entries’ and announced the tightening of border controls in order to curb the spread of the virus, in particular through increased boat patrols around the Aegean islands where illegalised migrants land (Lavelle 2020). It was only the following day, however, that the EU-Turkey collaboration established in 2016 to contain migrants collapsed, and President Erdogan announced the opening of Turkey’s borders, deliberately enabling the movements of migrants from its shores (Jauhiainen 2020). The renewed crossings of the Evros river were met with an unprecedented level of border violence, including shooting at migrants and throwing others into the river. While these practices caused a public outcry, Greece’s hard-line received the full backing of the EU, with Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission president, referring to Greece as a ‘European shield’ (Rankin 2020). Across the Aegean sea, where crossings increased markedly, Greece has resorted to its long standing practice of violently pushing back boats, but, as of the end of March, adopted a new indirect modality of this practice: drift-backs – a term proposed by Forensic Architecture researcher Stefanos Levidis to describe the calculated abandonment of migrants on board rescue rafts before the contested limit of Turkish waters (so as to avoid a confrontation with Turkey), letting the passengers drift back to Turkish shores (Keady-Tabbal and Mann 2020). While these violent bordering practices have made it hard for migrants actually to arrive on Greek territory, those who have succeeded in doing so have been unable to access the asylum procedure, which was suspended for several months, and faced discriminatory restrictions on their mobility within the
country justified as anti-Covid-19 measures, relegating them to overcrowded camps – such as the infamous Moria – where they have been put at greater risk of infection (MSF 2020). On 1st September, a first case of Covid-19 was detected among the 12,000 asylum seekers in Moria camp, which was strictly quarantined. After protests by the residents, the camp was set on fire and reduced to ashes on 9th of September. Both at the Greek borders and within its territory, then, ‘the pandemic has worked as an accelerator of an ongoing escalating politics of containment’, which has been inflected by sanitary policing (Tazzioli 2020).

State response to the pandemic has also inflected bordering practices in the central Mediterranean (see Refugee Rights Europe and End Pushbacks Partnership 2020 for an overview). Both in Italy and Malta, politicians have conflated the supposed ‘threat’ of migrants and that of the virus. Despite Italy being one of the epicentres of the pandemic in early 2020, former interior minister Matteo Salvini denounced the disembarkation of 276 migrants from the ship of rescue NGO SOS Méditerranée, arguing that ‘allowing the migrants to land from Africa, where the presence of the virus was confirmed, is irresponsible’, and called for Italy to make its borders ‘armour-plated’ (Tondo 2020). The rescued passengers were placed in isolation for two weeks to check for coronavirus, while the NGO’s crew was confined to the ship. As a result of such measures, and the lockdown and restrictions on travel that soon ensued, rescue NGOs were forced to stop their activities for several months (Ziniti 2020). Furthermore, in early April Italy and Malta, followed by Libya, declared their ports ‘unsafe’ in light of the pandemic and retracted themselves from the organisation of rescue activities. This has led to an escalation in the politics of abandonment at sea, as boats and their distressed passengers have been left unassisted or rescue been dangerously delayed. The ‘rescue’ that Italy and Malta have sought to organise, has taken the form of interceptions and pull-backs to Libya as a result of EU cooperation with the Libyan coast guard established since several years. In addition, the last months have seen the acceleration of the trend of privatized push-backs to Libya via merchant or fishing vessels, which has been documented over the last years (Heller 2019; Alarm Phone 2020). As a result, according to UNHCR data 10,950 migrants have been to brought back this year (up to 16 December) to the ‘hell’ that Libya represents for them. In addition to being detained and tortured for ransom in Libyan detention centres, in several instances returned migrants have been summarily deported into the desert at the borders of neighbouring countries (Hinnant and Debre 2020). The lucky few who have succeeded in reaching the shores of Italy and Malta have been quarantined for weeks on ferries rented out by these states and used as floating detention centres (ASGI 2020). While their use has been justified by the containment of the pandemic, conditions on board the ferries rather favour contagion, and in some cases migrants who had arrived months earlier on the main land but were tested positively for Covid-19 have been brought on board. Detained migrants have repeatedly protested and one man even dived over board seeking to escape, but died in the process (Brodie 2020).

The recent trends in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean briefly described here thus clearly illustrate the way border violence has been heightened in the wake of the pandemic, and inflected with a new ‘sanitary police’ logic (Fassin 2020). Containment against migration and against the virus have been conflated, and migrants been further deprived of their dignity and rights in general, and their right to protect their health from the virus in particular – which has led to migrant resistance. Borders have hardened along Europe’s external edges, and so have social boundaries within European societies. Violence against migrants and racialised populations – starting with Asian-looking populations – proliferated as fast as the coronavirus pandemic, across Europe and much of the rest of the world (Gamlen 2020; Wang et al. 2020). Paradoxically, this occurred at the very same time as migrants and racialised segments of the population were contributing an important share of the precarious but ‘essential’ work that could not be interrupted – or which the state and employers refused to. This has been particularly true of the health sector: in OECD countries 16% of nurses and 24% of doctors are born abroad (Scarpetta, Dumont, and Socha-Dietrich 20206). As a result, migrants and racialised populations (and among them women, who make up almost 70% of the health care workforce for example (OECD 2020)), have been made more vulnerable to the virus (Public Health
England 2020; OECD 2020), while at the same time being excessively targeted by the policing of lockdown measures (Amnesty 2020). As Ruth Gilmore Wilson has noted, this differential vulnerability in the face of the virus, along the lines of class, gender and so glaringly race, have laid the ground for the global uprising against anti-Black racism that we have witnessed over the last months (Gilmore Wilson 2020).

State responses to the pandemic have thus tended to reinforce existing borders and social boundaries and the violence deployed to police them. At the same time, this has been far from uniform, and several developments contradict this tendency towards convergence between sanitary and border policing. The restrictions on travel have been partial and ambivalent. Even at the height of internal and external confinement measures, when human mobility to and within Europe had largely been brought to a halt, channels of labour recruitment were being opened by some EU states in a hurry. The precaritized migrant labour already present within EU countries was apparently not sufficient for certain sectors of the economy to keep on running – such as agriculture. Flights were specifically chartered to carry seasonal workers from Eastern Europe to work in Germany’s all-important asparagus harvest without the slightest care for their protection, either during the travel or during their labour, which led to cases of infection and death amongst the recruited workers (Klawitter and Verseck 2020).

Further more, in some places and ways, the pandemic has rather reversed pre-pandemic hierarchies of (im)mobility. While illegalised migrants have been direly affected by border closure, as discussed above, travel bans have concerned as well EU citizens, who normally benefit from privileged mobility rights. We have also seen African states introducing travel restrictions for travellers coming from Europe, and at the height of the first wave of the pandemic in Spain, Moroccans began crossing the sea illegally but this time in the opposite direction (Lazreg and Garnaoui 2020). The interruption of international travel also blocked the routine operations of border work in different ways. With the execution of deportations temporarily blocked in the first half of the year, several countries such as Spain have freed migrants from detention centres (Piser 2020). Others, such as Portugal and Italy, began granting legal status and the right to stay to irregular migrants already present (Waldersie 2020), a positive step even though this process has still been framed by limiting criteria (Carlotti 2020). Citizen-migrant boundaries in accessing emergency housing during the pandemic have also been undermined in several European cities such as Berlin (Bruzellius and Ratzmann 2020), Liverpool (Bauder and Godoy 2020) or Barcelona (Triviño-Salazar 2020), reflecting the shift in the provision of different forms of state aid on the basis of need rather than legal status. Forms of mutual aid which have taken as starting point shared precarity to forge new commons have also proliferated (Sharma 2020; Springer 2020). Contradictory tendencies of reinforcing or undermining exclusionary borders and social boundaries have thus been at work.

Just as in the management of the 19th century cholera outbreak analysed by historian Valeksa Huber (Huber 2006), borders in the time of the new coronavirus have operated as ‘semipermeable membranes’, selectively blocking and channelling mobilities. The return of health as a key criteria in organising local and transnational mobility and border control (Bashford 2007) has partly overlapped with racialised and classed geographies of inclusion/exclusion but also undermined and transformed them. In other words, the global apartheid which uses citizenship and visa restrictions to police the differential access to mobility founded on race and class, has been supplemented by a fluctuating ‘sanitary apartheid’, seeking to separate populations designated as at risk of Covid-19 infection from those designated as Covid-free. The fluctuating boundaries of the sanitary apartheid are framed in benevolent ‘life-saving’ terms, but often entail protecting one group at the expense of those designated as its outsiders, and effectively entail the attribution of differential rights and possibilities of participation in social life. The lines delimiting the enduring global apartheid founded on citizenship, class and race and those of the new sanitary apartheid do not neatly coincide, and their logics may contradict each other. Where they do overlap, we see eruptive border violence, the stripping of rights as well as migrant resistance.
2. Beyond the partial re-opening of borders: rethinking freedom of movement in the time of the pandemic

The EU’s fragile, selective and securitized re-opening

After three months of stringent restriction on travel to and within the EU, Monday 15 June was heralded by the EU Commission as the ‘re-Open Borders Day of Schengen Area’ (Eudebates.tv 2020). Following the easing of the measures of confinement within their countries, states now partly ‘de-confined’ their borders for European citizens. This step, part of a phased process of reopening borders between countries designated as ‘safe’ in terms of the pandemic, was still far from restoring freedom of movement across the EU (Abellán and Sánchez 2020) and even further from granting all people – including populations of the global South – the equal right to move and stay. Over the summer months, EU member states implemented the lifting travel restrictions within complicated geographies and at variegated pace, reflecting the same lack of coordination the closing of borders had before (Euronews 2020). In Europe and across the world we witnessed the emergence of supposedly sanitised ‘travel corridors’ or ‘travel bubbles’ allowing for smooth mobility for those labelled ‘covid free’ (Gamlen 2020). But the term ‘bubble’ being used should have been enough to indicate how volatile these partial re-openings would be. As Huub Dijstelbloem and William Walters have noted, bubbles do not designate ‘fixed or permanent enclosures’, but rather temporary, adaptable and fragile spheres (Dijstelbloem and Walters 2019). In effect, over the following months, transport bubbles expanded and retracted at the whim of states, and as a function of changing rates of infection and diplomatic bargaining (Syta 2020). Air travel picked up slightly over the summer but the behaviour travellers adopted on both ends of their journeys contributed to spreading across the continent a distinct Spanish version of the mutating coronavirus (Hodcroft et al. 2020). As I write in mid-December 2020, Europe is in the midst of a large second wave of Covid-19, and degrees of lockdown have been imposed again across most countries while international air travel stands at – 63% for December in relation to the same time in 2019 (Eurocontrol 2020). Progressively however, blanket travel restrictions have been replaced by sanitary conditions, such as testing and quarantine for those travelling from regions with a high rate of infection (Pradelski and Oliu-Barton 2020; IOM 2020).

The partial re-opening of European societies from internal and external confinement measures and the limited resumption of international travel has also been enabled by far more disseminated, sophisticated and individualised forms of sanitary control, lending the impression of seeing in fast-forward the shift from 17th century modes of disciplinary power analysed by Michel Foucault (1977) to the modes of reticular government characteristic of the ‘societies of control’ of the present diagnosed by Gilles Deleuze (1992). Just as was the case in past pandemics such as 19th century cholera outbreaks (Huber 2006), the imperative to perpetuate ‘productive mobilities’ while limiting the spread of the coronavirus has led to a speeding up in the development of new tracking technologies – such as the many Covid applications designed to trace contacts if a person is found to be infected (Holmes, McCurry, and Safi 2020) – and new means of identification – such as the Covid-19 immunity passport proposed by companies and states to identify the health status of its owner and police access to Covid-free bubbles for work and travel (Schengenvisainfo 2020; McQuade and Neocleous 2020). While we cannot rule out that some technologies may indeed by helpful to detect infected cases early and trace their contacts so as to avoid the spread of the virus, there is a real risk that the deployment of new means of ‘bio-digital-surveillance’ (Bigo 2020) heighten the already existing trend towards more invasive forms of control that turn the body itself into a border (Mbembe 2019; Amoore and Hall 2009).

From the perspective of global mobility regimes, the development of different variants of Covid-19 immunity passports, and the recent announcement by the airline Qantas that travellers would have to be vaccinated against Covid-19 to board the company’s flights (BBC 2020), is particularly worrying, for it is bound to heighten global mobility inequality in the context of unequal access to vaccines. Several anti-Covid-19 vaccines have been tested successfully and are being rolled-out over
the coming months, thus making the prospect of societies durably returning to ‘normal’ seem nearer, and with it the resumption of international travel. However, the possibility of being vaccinated and the opportunities this will afford promise to be highly unevenly distributed as a result of the hoarding of vaccines by countries of the global North at the expense of those of the global South (OHCHR 2020). The coupling of vaccine nationalism and the ‘immunoprivilege’ (Olivarius 2019) it is bound to generate on the one hand, and the policing of access to international travel via variants of Covid-19 immunity passports on the other, raises the serious risk that we will see the further convergence of the geographies of the global mobility apartheid founded on citizenship, class and race with the sanitary apartheid founded on the risk of infection in a way that may exacerbate existing global mobility inequalities.

In the face of this scenario, in the remainder of this article I want to ask a simple question: can we imagine a better re-opening of borders than that we have seen over the last months, and that which the conjunction of immunoprivilege and sanitary policing promises for the near future? I will argue that in the context of the pandemic, the demand for universal freedom of movement is more important than ever (Mezzadra and Stier 2020), but I will also argue that it needs to be significantly re-thought in light of unequal and contradictory (im)mobility entanglements that the pandemic has brought to the fore.

**Freedom of movement in the time of the pandemic? Yes please!**

Activists and researchers alike have long argued that state policies aiming to deny migrants from the global South the right to move across borders are unjust and ultimately fail, precaritizing migrants’ lives and generating profound political crises (Pécou and de Guchteneire 2006; Anderson, Sharma and Wright. 2009). As I have argued elsewhere (Heller 2018), European citizens and policy makers alike must realize that in an interconnected world marked by sharp inequalities and crises of all sorts, the question is not whether migrants will exercise their freedom to cross borders, but at what human and political cost. As Nandita Sharma underlines, and the examples evoked above illustrate, ‘the real effect of border controls is not to restrict movement but to restrict the rights and entitlements of the people who are able to move into nation states’ (Sharma 2020). State policies can only create a legal frame for human movement to unfold and thereby partly organise it, they cannot block it completely. Only a more open policy would allow migration to unfold in a way that threatens neither migrants themselves nor European citizens. With legal access to Europe, migrants would no longer need to resort to smugglers and risk their lives crossing the sea. Since states would no longer police migrants through military means, the border surveillance industry could be defunded, and migration could appear as a normal process that does not generate fear. With such a policy, borders would cease to be a ‘sign or elements of the impossible’ and become more fully, in the words of Edouard Glissant, spaces of ‘passage and transformation’ (Glissant 2006).

The demand for a policy founded on the freedom to move conjures many challenging issues – starting, of course, with the fact that it is far from being on the European political agenda. One must also address seriously the ambivalent effects such a policy might lead to on different levels – what I have called elsewhere the ‘antinomies of freedom of movement’ (Heller, Pezzani and Stierl 2018). For example, one of the arguments coming both from the nationalist left and right – and even from some more sympathetic critics such as Etienne Balibar –, has been that institutionalising the freedom to move risks ending up realising the neoliberal dream of abundant and disposable labour, threatening the labour conditions of more sedentary workers (Balibar 2004). This critique must be taken seriously, all the more so in the context of a major recession that is already heightening anti-immigrant sentiments (Gamlen 2020). One can respond to it productively by arguing that this risk is precisely mitigated by the equality of rights that legalizing migration fosters. Furthermore, the right to move across borders for people must be accompanied with limitations on the movements of capital and the upholding of decent working conditions – which can be imposed by labour solidarity across the migrant/citizen divide. The ambivalences and contradictions of freedom of movement
then should not lead to abandoning this claim – which in any case echoes through migrants’ struggles on a daily basis – but to articulating it further with other political practices and demands beyond the simple opening of borders.

Today, in the context of the pandemic, we must take seriously another possible negative effect, not affect of the (free) movement of people: the risk that it contributes to spreading the virus. Taking this risk seriously is the condition to devise solutions to mitigate it without compromising on migrants’ rights and freedoms. As I have acknowledged above, this risk is very real, as the virus spread across the globe through the movement and contact of people enabled by global transport systems. But I want to argue there were alternatives to the nationalist folding in and violent bordering of states we have witnessed.

First, the existence of differentials in the prevalence of the virus between regions and countries at the beginning of the pandemic need not have led countries to seal themselves off. After all, as argued above, such drastic measures can only be effective at very early stages, before a virus has been introduced within a population. Furthermore, the nationalist ‘folding in’ and imposition of authoritarian sanitary measures within countries and at their borders we have seen are in and of themselves entirely insufficient responses to a pandemic since, in a highly connected global society, a virus can’t be definitely controlled locally until it is controlled everywhere. While it is beyond the scope of this article to expand on it, a progressive sanitary policy would have been imaginable, combining for example new means of protection and solidarity at the local level – such as the minimum basic income implemented in Spain (Lapavitsas et al. 2020) and universal health care – and at the international level – involving the sharing of knowledge and technologies but also broad debt cancellation and increased aid (Transnational Institute 2020). Based on solidarity and the recognition of rights, a progressive approach would have fostered collective practices of ‘care for others and ourselves’ (Sotiris 2020), and guaranteed our access to the material and health conditions (UNAIDS 2020) that are necessary for populations to be protected and protect themselves from the virus wherever they are. In this way, the perceived need to close borders would have been undermined.

Second, even considering the absence of such a progressive and internationalist policy, which has clearly not been on the political agenda, seeking to seal borders is not an effective way to contain the spread of a pandemic, and in fact generates further risks of contagion. As argued above, blanket closure of borders are not recommended by epidemiologists, or only in exceptional circumstances (such as islands early on in the spread of a pandemic), since they entail ‘societal and economic disruption’ (ECDC 2020). Instead of blanket closure, epidemiologists, including those of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), advocate the introduction of a number of measures to mitigate the risk of contamination through international mobility. These include information to travellers before departure, the application during travel of all the standard measures of physical distancing, hand hygiene and facemasks, and upon arrival, screening and even possible quarantine and testing if justified. The ECDC’s recommendations concerning these basic sanitary measures to mitigate risk in the course of our mobilities across different scales are broadly those that have been applied to legal travellers in the EU since the partial and temporary lifting of travel restrictions in summer 2020. While these measures have demanded that mobility habits be quite profoundly transformed, and while the risk of contracting the virus and the extensive periods of quarantine have acted as a disincentive for passengers leading to levels of international travel to and within the EU remaining low, such sanitary measures do not limit the right of people to cross borders.

These precautionary measures are precisely denied to impoverished and othered migrants from the global South whose mobility to and within the EU is illegalised. As in the pre-pandemic situation, drastic border closure has not resulted in the end of their mobility – more than 83,000 illegalised migrants have arrived on European shores this year, and 1000 lost their lives in the attempt to do so (UNHCR data). But without migrants having access to legal and formal means of travel, adopting the measures described above (and which the UNHCR also advocated for early on (UNHCR 2020)) has been far more difficult. How can one imagine illegalised migrants adopting physical distancing in overcrowded boats, or wearing face-masks after they have been deprived of everything for months.
by their Libyan captors? It is the very illegalisation of migration that creates the conditions that entail greater risk to migrants’ lives in general, and of infection of the Covid-19 virus in particular. Unable to protect themselves, they are less able to protect the people they encounter. Granting migrants the right to cross borders in legal ways has long been the best way to mitigate the multiple risks that affect illegalized migrants’ lives. Today it is also a contribution to mitigating the risk of Covid-19 infection for them and others. In this sense, adopting policies founded on the freedom of movement of all people should be a measure we demand of our states now, not in some distant (post-Covid) future. Likewise, granting legal status and the right to stay to irregular migrants already present, as has begun to be initiated in countries such as Portugal and Italy, are essential measures to guarantee that they have access to health care and welfare (Waldensee 2020). Recognising migrants’ right to move and stay, and ensuring that they are able to exercise their social and labour rights as well as their right to health is the condition to protect migrants and sedentary populations alike. In the time of the pandemic, then, the freedom to move and the right to stay remain as fundamental a demand as ever before. The range of sanitary measures adopted by rescue NGOs (that have been able to resume their operations at sea in June) with the aim of protecting the health of their precarious ‘guests’ and crew illustrates that the freedom to move – re-articulated in the context of the pandemic – can serve as a crucial political compass to guide practices of solidarity across land and sea in the present.

**Limiting the exercise of destructive mobility privileges: towards mobility justice**

If it is essential to rearticulate the politics of freedom of movement in the context of the pandemic, one should not abstract it either from the global uprising against anti-Blackness and racism, the acute economic crisis that has been triggered the drastic lockdown (Lapavitsas et al. 2020) and finally the climate crisis and the ecological destructsions that has contributed to unleashing the new coronavirus in the first place. Today, more than ever, the different crises that intersect in our global conjuncture should not be separated, either analytically or politically (Mohandesi 2020). The concept of ‘mobility justice’ which has been developed by Mimi Sheller, offers a useful lens to think of the way mobility operates across these nested crises, and more importantly, how mobility might be thought of and practiced in a way that contributes to global justice. ‘We can think about mobility justice occurring at different scales’, Sheller writes, ‘from micro-level embodied interpersonal relations, to meso-level issues of urban transportation justice and the “right to the city,” to macro-level transnational relations of travel and borders, and ultimately global resource flows and energy circulation’ (Sheller 2018). Importantly, through the perspective of mobility justice one is able to locate within the same analytical frame the movement of the othered and dispossessed which is limited and precaritized by the global apartheid, and the high-speed and comfortable travel of those who are located at the top of the hierarchies of mobility. In continuity with colonial discourses, the movement of populations of the global South is today framed as ‘excessive’ (Kotef 2015), while it is in fact the privileged citizens of the global North who have exercised their freedom to move at an excessive cost for the environment, and for the communities that are most affected by it (Harrabin 2020; Oswald, Owen, and Steinberger 2020). While global air travel has grown exponentially and until recently ‘more than a million people were literally flying through the air at any given moment’ (Gamlen 2020), less than 10% of the global population has ever taken a flight (Stay Grounded 2019). High-speed carbon intensive air travel – which accounts for about 2.5 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions (Tabuchi 2019) – is one more manifestation of the destructive consumption of the privileged – mostly located in the global North – that must be challenged (Beuret 2019). In this respect, the temporary interruption of air travel discussed earlier in this article can be seen as a positive outcome of the pandemic. Going back to the ‘normality’ of mass air travel for the privileged is no more desirable then the perpetuation of the planetary apartheid for the othered and dispossessed.
During the course of the pandemic, we have observed ambivalent tendencies pointing both towards the potential for profound transformation of mobility systems, and towards the restoration of the status quo. These contradictory possibilities were perceived early on by Mimi Sheller who asked what might be the ripple effects and tipping points triggered by this interruption of air travel but also other means of carbon intensive mobility: ‘As countries seek to recover and pull out of this mobility shock, will we seek to return to the high-mobility, high-energy, high-carbon economy of the past? Or will we begin the urgently needed shift to a low-carbon economy, one premised on more resilient, regenerative, and circular forms of local exchange?’ (Sheller, 2020). Since Sheller formulated her open-ended questions, some of the worst scenarios she considered have materialised: rather than investing massively in making their economies and societies sustainable, states have offered bailouts to airlines even as they layout their employees (Dutheil 2020). But we have also seen some of the more optimistic scenarios Sheller imagined being partly realized: to help people substitute their use of public transport without resorting to cars, ‘thousands of miles of new bike lanes have been built in cities from Milan to Mexico City, huge swathes of residential streets in places from New York to Bogotá are being closed to traffic’ (Taylor 2020).

While contradictory tendencies coexist, a recent study by banking group Lombard Odier bets on a green ‘mobility revolution’ in the wake of the Covid pandemic (Church 2020). What is certain is that the interruption of our socialities, mobilities and economies has positioned us at a crossroads, in which radical changes that were deemed impossible only a few months ago are contemplated in a polyphonic debate. As states and societies are still struggling to slow the curve of the rate of Covid-19 infections, it is urgent we act to slow the curve of carbon emissions as well (Descamps and Lebel 2020). The question then, as Achille Mbembe has put it, is how we can turn the interruption the pandemic has forced upon us into a voluntary and conscious one? (Mbembe 2020). Or in the terms of the degrowth approach, we face a choice between ‘slowing down by design’ or by disaster (Paulson, D’Alisa, and Demaria 2020). Transforming mobility systems must be part of this radical re-designing of our life in common.

But is there not a profound contradiction in my call for a universal recognition of the right to free movement on the one hand, and to limit drastically the polluting movement of the privileged on the other? I think not. Those who cannot stay where they are, because of wars, political and economic crisis, the lack of prospect to realise their lives, will continue to move no matter what restrictions states impose, and they must have the right to travel with safe and legal means. But those who are privileged enough to be able to stay put and limit their travel – such as researchers as myself for whom most conferences have been cancelled or shifted online – should do so, as one among many other necessary contributions to the decarbonisation of our economies and societies. This collective process of self-limitation of movement, which should be accompanied by state regulations and taxes on polluting fuels, and investments into alternatives to air travel, such as rail systems (Green New Deal for Europe 2019) need not, however, be seen as an unfreedom. Once one ‘decolonizes our imaginaries from the ethics of limitless expansion’ and the associated understanding of freedom as ‘doing as you please, which means freedom for the strong’ (Kallis 2019) one may begin to perceive instead the self-limitation of movement as another form of exercise of the freedom to move (Mezzadra and Stier 2020).

This (self-)limitation of polluting movement is consistent with the ‘mobile commons’ approach advocated by Mimi Sheller, which does not simply imply ‘maximizing mobility for all people’, but means instead ‘protecting the capability for human and more-than-human shared mobilities and free spaces for movement by regulating excessive mobilities, limiting unnecessary speed, regulating corporations, pricing the externalities of transportation, and preventing its harms’ (Sheller 2018). If the limitation of mobility by the privileged must then not necessarily be thought of as an unfreedom, conversely the claim to freedom and equality of the othered and dispossessed can also not be reduced to more (legal) mobility. Scholars and activists focusing on illegalised migration should never forget that ‘to have to force one’s way across
borders as a result of one’s misery is as scandalous as what founds that misery’ (Glissant, 2006). As such, the demand for the right to international mobility should be articulated as well with the right not to be displaced by political and economic turmoil as well as ecological destruction, all of which are the outcome of the capitalist world system (Bacon 2013; Van Naerssen 2014; Novak 2016).

Conclusions
The Covid-19 pandemic is a planetary crisis, in which all dimensions of our lives have been profoundly destabilised, generating great suffering in the process. By revealing the impermanence of what appeared to be immutable, crises open the possibility that things might be otherwise and spur renewed political imagination. Crises are also moments of struggle, in which all actors in a given system vie to define the new configuration of power that will emerge out of the system’s future re-stabilisation. In this time, I believe it is crucial that mobility and migration scholars not only analyse and seek to make intelligible the way different forms of mobilities have been both profoundly implicated and affected in turn by the pandemic as bordering practices have mutated, but also take a stand, contribute to the collective work of political imagination, and raise their voices within the polyphonic chorus of actors seeking to steer us out of the present conjunction of multiple life-threatening crises towards a more just and sustainable world.

In this article I have sought to chart some of the profound transformations of bordering practices through which mobilities are governed. As I have shown, the logic of the enduring ‘global mobility apartheid’ which uses citizenship and visa restrictions to police the differential access to mobility founded on race and class has been supplemented by a fluctuating ‘sanitary apartheid’, seeking to separate populations designated as at risk of Covid-19 infection from those designated as Covid-free. These distinct politics of separation of lives and (im)mobilities have entered in disjunctive and contradictory relations, since for example the mobility privilege of European citizens has been undermined but also partly replaced by the immobility privilege of safe confinement. Where these logics have overlapped and reinforced each other, as has been the case along the EU’s external borders, we have seen eruptive border violence, the stripping of rights as well as migrant resistance.

In this context, reflecting on the demand for the freedom to move may appear wishful thinking and chimerical. After all, if the demand for a mobility regime founded on the equal right of all to exercise their freedom to move was already a minoritarian position before the pandemic, the current association of ‘foreigners’ with the fear of contagion and the deployment of police measures in the name of protecting life makes it even more difficult to defend. And yet I believe there is no more urgent time to re-open and re-articulate this perspective than at the time when the global mobility apartheid is mutating and when migrants face new risks associated with the pandemic that urgently demand our response. Policies and practices enabling migrants’ legal and safe mobility, and thus also allowing them to protect their health and that of others, are even more urgent in the context of the pandemic. We may also hope that, now that citizens of the global North have experienced first hand the stringent limitations on international travel that is normally reserved to the populations of the global South, they may perceive in a different light the demands for freedom and equality that are expressed through struggles for migration (Reynolds 2020). And yet I have no illusions that the policies I have called for here will be applied in the near future – in light of the highly unequal distribution of the anti-Covid-19 vaccine across the globe and new forms of sanitary policing via Covid-19 immunity passports, the prospect in the coming months is rather that of even more glaring mobility inequality. Nevertheless, the perspective of mobility justice I have mobilised here may help draw new connections between different forms of oppression and demands for justice. The connections in turn may serve as the basis for new alliances, for example between the migrant solidarity and climate justice movements. The re-articulation of the demand for freedom of movement within a mobility justice perspective may then less be seen as a blueprint for a perfect future, then as
a perspective that may help crystallise entangled struggles to contest the most dystopian scenarios that are already materialising in the present.

Instead of replicating the conflation of the ‘threat’ of illegalised migrants and of the virus that serves to occlude the broader entangled geographies that have led us to this pandemic crisis (Anderson 2020), the mobility justice perspective enables the foregrounding of the existence of entangled mobilities, and with that, entangled oppressions and struggles. The intersectional politics pioneered by Black women has taught us that the forms of oppression that aren’t ‘separate in our bodies’ should not be separated in our struggles either (Davis 2016). Today, one of the expressions these entangled oppressions manifests itself in the growing impossibility for many to breathe. Black women and men can’t breathe – as other categories of racialized subjects – as they encounter the violence of the police on firm land; illegalised migrants who are denied the right to move on the basis of race and class hierarchies also can’t breathe, as their precarious movement leads thousands to die in the Mediterranean (Turati 2020); predatory capitalism is destroying global ecosystems, including the forests that serve as the lungs of the Earth, leading to suffocating heat for humans and non-humans alike while unleashing new deadly viruses, such as the Covid-19, which attacks our respiratory capacities (Wallace, Liebman and Wallace 2020). Considering the interlocking crisis of the pandemic, economic crisis, ecological crisis, and the crises of border, racist and sexist violence, all of which are making life unbearable for so many, I can only join Achille Mbembe in calling for a universal right to breathe as the basis for profoundly transforming our planetary life in common (Mbembe 2020). Radically de-confining borders, that is, undoing the enduring limits that borders impose on the movement of populations of the global South within the global apartheid, but also ending the exercise of destructive mobility privileges, must be part of this transformation.

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Notes

1. Italy had introduced a national lockdown on March 9, Germany had implemented school and border closures starting March 13, Spain followed on March 14, and France on March 16. For an extensive data set on travel restrictions and border control, see https://nccr-onthemove.ch/news-covid-19-and-mobility/migration-and-mobility-in-a-pandemic/
2. The term ‘confine', with its etymology linked to confines, an older term for borders at present rarely used in English but common in most Latin languages, suggests a connection between these internal and external policies which hinge on imposing new limits to human sociality and mobility. See https://www.etymonline.com/word/pandemic
4. I thank Stefanos Levidis for sharing his analysis, on which this section draws.
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