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ABSTRACT
The Right Wing of the Polish emigration after 1830 explained the disappearance of the Polish state in 1795 and the failure of their recent war against tsarist Russia by the absence of a strong leadership and, in particular, by the absence of a king and a hereditary monarchy. The most suitable candidate for king was Prince Adam Czartoryski, head of the right-wing emigration and a leader of the emigration as a whole. Czartoryski declined the title for reasons related to his own Hamlet-like character and, above all, by his conviction that the time was not ripe for an insurrection which assumption of the royal title would have entailed.

KEYWORDS
Adam Czartoryski; emigration; insurrection; monarchy; Poland; Republic

Why did Poland disappear? This was the central question asked by the ‘Great Emigration’ of 1830–1831 – great not because of numbers (barely 11,000 individuals) but because of the identity of the émigrés and the place that the ‘Great Emigration’ occupies in Polish historiography.1 Lord Acton has called the complete dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Republic (Rzeczpospolita), once the largest state in Europe, 'the most revolutionary act of the old absolutism'.2 Poland disappeared from the map in 1795, after the last of three partitions undertaken by its powerful neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria.3 With the paltry exception of the short-lived Grand Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon in 1807 to further his geopolitical ends, and the ‘Congress Kingdom’ that emerged from the Congress of Vienna bound to Russia by a personal tie (the Russian tsar was also king of Poland), an independent Polish state was not to appear until after the First World War.

The failure of the 1830 insurrection (the ‘November Insurrection’) that precipitated the ‘Great Emigration’ reposed the original question in a more acute form. Whereas previously Poland’s inexistence had seemed a temporary aberration and little had changed in the day-to-day life of the country, after 1830 it became clear that what had been seen as an aberration was fated to last.4 The emigration, in a completely new context thus asked itself not only why had Poland disappeared a generation earlier but why had the November Insurrection, seen by many as a Russian-Polish war, failed.

The answers to both these questions served to demarcate the right and left wings of Polish thought. For those on the right-wing, the Polish problem was the lack of a strong leadership. They blamed the ‘Republican’ constitution that had made Poland an elective monarchy for over two hundred years for the ultimate disintegration of the country and the absence of a strong leader for the failure of the recent insurrection.5 For thinkers on the right, Poland needed a hereditary monarchy which would govern the country with a strong hand. For the left wing, in contrast, emancipation of the peasantry was the key to restoration of a Polish state. Only if the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the population, joined in the struggle for Polish independence, would Poland...
be restored and the peasantry would only join in that struggle if it were free and enjoyed ownership
of the land it tilled. Thinkers of the left pointed at the gentry (szlachta)\[^6\] with animosity, blaming its
eгоism and anarchical disposition for the fall of the Polish state and the failure of the insurrection.\[^7\]
The right-wing also criticized the behaviour in the past of the Polish gentry but it looked to this class
to lead the struggle for Polish independence.

In January 1837, at a meeting of the Polish Literary Society in Paris, a small group of right-wing
stalwarts declared the sixty-six year old leader of the right-wing of the Polish emigration, Prince
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, king of Poland \textit{de facto}.\[^8\] This move carried out by a ‘young group’
later known as the ‘dynasts’ or ‘electors’ was not supported by much of the right wing of the emi-
grant and, of course, was vigorously criticized by the left-wing committed to a future republican
Poland.\[^9\] The ‘dynasts’ claimed the authority of the recently deceased and much loved Maurycc
Mochnacki who, apparently, had undergone a complete volte-face in his last years and had
endorsed the monarchical project, as did, for a time, the most famous bard of Polish romanticism,
Adam Mickiewicz.\[^10\] Most surprisingly, and significantly, however, the move was not endorsed by
the beneficiary himself, Prince Czartoryski.\[^11\]

Who was Adam Jerzy Czartoryski?\[^12\] Born in 1770 to one of the grandest Polish families, his
father and uncle were in the forefront of efforts to modernize Poland on the eve of its extinction.
It was thanks to the efforts of the ‘família’, as the Czartoryskis and their supporters were known, that
the last king of Poland, Stanisław August Poniatowski, a Czartoryski nephew and former lover of
Empress Catherine II of Russia, was elected. Poniatowski proved a disappointment to his reform-
minded sponsors. Although the king distinguished himself through his cultural achievements, it
was during his reign that the three partitions of Poland took place leading to the disappearance
of his kingdom. Still, the Polish Commonwealth under Stanisław August Poniatowski promulgated
a certain number of reforms, such as those in the realm of education. Most notably, Poland adopted
the Governmental Statute or Constitution of 3 May 1791, a lodestar for conservative forces in the
emigration. 3 May is even celebrated today in post-communist Poland as the second democratic
constitution in the world (after that of the United States).\[^13\] The \textit{émigré} left denounced the 3
May Constitution as a partial document that enthroned the status quo and preferred to celebrate
29 November, the day when the uprising of 1830 had begun.\[^14\] Adam Jerzy Czartoryski venerated
the Constitution of 3 May all his life.\[^15\] Although the Constitution was in force only for a little over a
year, being annulled by the Second Partition of Poland in 1793, he saw in it the last legal act of the
old Polish Commonwealth and one which constituted a precious legacy.\[^16\]

After the failure of the 1794 Kosciuszko Uprising, in which Czartoryski (allegedly?) participated,
he was sent with his brother as a hostage to the court of St. Petersburg.\[^17\] There he developed a close
friendship with the grandson of Empress Catherine II, the future tsar, Alexander I who, at that time,
under the influence of his Swiss tutor, Fréderic de la Harpe, appeared to have had more liberal views
than Czartoryski himself.\[^18\] In a move unpopular with the Russian elite, in 1805, Alexander, now
emperor, appointed Czartoryski as his foreign minister.\[^19\] Unlike most Poles at the time, Czartor-
yski adopted a staunchly anti-napoleonic conception.\[^20\] At the Congress of Vienna in that ended in
1815 Czartoryski served as one of the advisors of the strong man of the moment, tsar Alexander.
The outcome of the Congress, a kingdom of Poland linked to Russia through the fact that the
tsar was also king of Poland, appears to have disappointed Czartoryski who was hoping for a res-
toration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonweath that had disappeared twenty years earlier.\[^21\] Czartor-
yski was further disappointed by Alexander’s failure to make good on his promise to incorporate
the Commonwealth’s Eastern territories, the Kresy as Poles referred to them, into the Congress
Kingdom. Even though the Congress Kingdom enjoyed a liberal constitution, which ultimately
proved incompatible with the nature of absolutist Russia, Czartoryski withdrew from all public
activities, including the curatorship of the University of Vilnius, in which position he had worked
tirelessly on behalf of Polish education until 1823. It was in this period of self-imposed inner exile
that Czartoryski wrote \textit{L’Essai sur la diplomatie}, considered a milestone in the development of mod-
ern thought.\[^22\] Czartoryski was called back into politics during the Insurrection of 1830 as head of
the National Government, a position he assumed reluctantly and which he resigned in August 1831 in protest against the increasing radicalization of the insurrectionary movement; Czartoryski’s aim was to prevent the insurrection from becoming a national revolution and to have it considered simply as an uprising against disregard for the constitution. He is reputed to have cried out, ‘you have lost Poland’ when the Diet dethroned the Russian tsar as king of Poland. All in all, Czartoryski was a hesitant insurrectionist during the events of 1830/1831.

In emigration after the fall of the insurrection, Czartoryski, for long a confirmed anglophile (as a very young man he had attended the parliamentary proceedings about Warren Hasting’s impeachment), first hastened to London but, eventually, settled in Paris. Here, in 1843, after having resided in the Rue de l’Université, he was able to purchase, thanks to the good husbandry of his mother-in-law, the Hôtel Lambert, a grand seventeenth-century mansion on the Eastern tip of the Ile St. Louis. Henceforth, his political grouping, and indeed the entire right-wing of the Polish emigration, was known by the name of this residence. Although Czartoryski made a show of wanting to unite the emigration as a whole, his early efforts were largely devoted to combatting ‘Jacobin’ tendencies among his exiled countrymen. In January 1833, perhaps convinced of the impossibility of uniting the emigration Czartoryski founded the Association of National Unity (Towarzystwo Jedności Narodowej), a secret organization modelled on Masonic and perhaps Carbonari groupings, that was to work for Polish independence. The Association foundered and was replaced at the end of 1837 by the no-longer secret Insurrectionist-Monarchist Association of Liberators (Związek Insurekcyjno-Monarchiczny Wyjarzniczyl). It was this organization that put out the main monarchist journal, Trzeci Maj (3 May) that lasted for over ten years and that replaced the Kronika Polskiej Emigracji (The Chronicle of the Polish Emigration) leading to an acrimonious split within the Czartoryski camp between the editor of the Kronika, Karol Boromeusz Hoffmann as well as one of Czartoryski’s secretaries, Karol Kazimierz Sienkiewicz, and the ‘young electors’ who put out Trzeci Maj.

Czartoryski continued as head of the right-wing of the Polish emigration, the Hôtel Lambert, until his death at the age of 91. He worked tirelessly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to convince international public opinion, particularly political leaders in Great Britain and France, of the justice of the Polish Cause and the need to restore Polish independence for both moral and strategic reasons. In his later years, he concentrated on cultural and educational enterprises though, on the eve of the Crimean War, the eighty-three year old Pole hastened to London to lobby the British cabinet. He complained of the senility of the then prime minister, Lord Aberdeen, who happened to be fourteen years younger than Czartoryski himself. The question remains of why did Czartoryski not accept the Polish crown? Among the several reasons one can invoke the following:

Ironically, Czartoryski had a stronger attachment to the literal terms of the Constitution of May 3rd than those who claimed to act in its name. To be sure, the Constitution called for a strong executive authority to be wielded by the king. Rejecting elective monarchy and the periods of interregnum in between elections it provided in detail for the passage of royal power through hereditary succession in the House of Wettin, the electors of Saxony who had furnished Poland with two elective kings. Napoleon had appointed a member of the House of Wettin to rule the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in the early nineteenth century and, during the First World War, the regency Kingdom of Poland, a German attempt at creating a puppet state in Poland, was to be ruled by the House of Wettin. Moreover, two much respected (and elective) monarchs, Stefan Batory in the sixteenth century and Jan Sobieski in the seventeenth century, had advocated a hereditary monarchy to avoid the chaos and foreign interference endemic to Polish royal elections.

Those Polish emigrés in favour of crowning Czartoryski as king vigorously rejected the very idea of a foreign dynasty on the Polish throne. A foreign dynasty would never be accepted by the Polish people, wrote Janusz Woronicz, one of the most zealous of the ‘young electors’. He and others argued that foreign kings would be forced to rely on their own compatriots who would enter Poland as hangers-on and only on unreliable national forces. Whereas the emigration, particularly its right wing, celebrated the first Polish dynasty, the Piasts rather than the last dynasty, the
Jagiellonians, partisans of crowning Czartoryski extolled the Jagiellonian blood that flowed in his veins. In tacit recognition of emerging national consciousness, they also reminded their readers that the Czartoryskis were both a Lithuanian and a Ruthenian, i.e. Ukrainian family, hence one that united all parts of the former Commonwealth.34

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski did not exclude completely the idea of a king not of royal blood. ‘If it were someone other than myself, I might agree’, he wrote.35 However, as a man raised in the age of the Enlightenment rather than in a time of romanticism and emerging national consciousness, he clearly preferred the legitimacy of royal descent. During the Insurrection of 1830, in spite of his earlier anti-Napoleonic sentiments, he raised the issue of proclaiming Napoleon’s son, the Duke of Reichstadt, king of Poland. In the face of Metternich’s resistance to this idea, he offered the crown to an Austrian Archduke, Archduke Karl or indeed any Archduke, and then to a younger son of the king of the Netherlands.36

The project of proclaiming a foreign royal, rather than himself, as king of Poland, also had a strategic purpose in Czartoryski’s mind. It was a way to gain the adherence of foreign powers for the restoration of Poland. In Czartoryski’s view, only under foreign pressure, combined with a successful insurrection throughout the Polish Commonwealth but directed primarily at tsarist Russia, would Polish independence be regained. Proclaiming Czartoryski as king of Poland preempted the possibility of enlisting foreign help by offering the Polish crown to a member of a foreign dynasty. To be sure, acceptance of the royal title by Czartoryski would have allayed the fears of French authorities who looked suspiciously at the Polish emigration, accused, with some reason, of harbouring republican tendencies. The French government of Louis Philippe had even made the refusal to convocate the Polish Sejm of 1830 a condition of Czartoryski’s installation in Paris.37 These were not sufficient reasons to make Czartoryski king.

Most significant in explaining Czartoryski’s refusal to accept the crown that was offered him, was the difference between his view regarding the timing of the anticipated Polish insurrection and the views of the members of the Monarchist-Insurrectionist Society. Both Czartoryski and the ‘young electors’ were aware that acceptance of the crown implied leadership of an immediate insurrection, one that Woronicz and others considered imminent but one that Czartoryski wanted to postpone, awaiting a favourable moment.38 For him the insurrection should take place when all Poland was committed to it (according to Woronicz it was so already) and when the Polish Cause could count on the armed intervention of the Western powers. Such a moment did seem to occur several times, most notably in 1853–4 when France and Great Britain entered into war against Russia in what became known as the Crimean War. To Czartoryski’s great disappointment, and in spite of active Polish involvement, the Crimean War did not lead to Polish independence.39

Another point of disagreement between Czartoryski and his would-be supporters was their attitude to the relation between the szlachta and the peasantry. Whereas the left denounced the szlachta as responsible for Poland’s ills and saw no future role for it, the right-wing viewed the szlachta as the necessary locomotive in the struggle for Polish independence and left the question of the emancipation of the peasant to a future, undetermined date.40 Czartoryski could hardly repudiate the szlachta, both for reasons proper to his upbringing and family history and because of the identity of his camp, largely made up of members of this caste. He was keenly aware, however, of the urgent need to bring about emancipation and his solution was to urge the szlachta to liberate their peasantry of their own free will; an admittedly utopian proposal, already defeated in 1830, and one which was to find no echo later.

There were other factors militating in favour of Czartoryski’s decision not to proclaim himself king. The notion of a king without a country must have seemed incongruous to him as well as to a number of others. Clearly, the conditions of exile were not conducive to proclaiming royal (or indeed any other) authority. Czartoryski was perhaps also aware of the expression attributed to Napoleon: ‘From the sublime to the ridiculous is only a small step’.41 Moreover, Czartoryski was keenly aware of the widespread opposition to the project. Opposition emanated not only from the left-wing of the emigration that ridiculed the move to proclaim Czartoryski king. Opposition
also came from Poland itself where the leading families, the magnates to whom Czartoryski belonged, opposed the move, refusing to be subject to exile politics. Opposition emanated too from within Czartoryski’s camp itself.42

Finally, there were personal reasons for Czartoryski’s reluctance. The main proponent of the idea of Czartoryski as king was his nephew and close collaborator, Władysław Zamoyski. Count Zamoyski has been suspected of wanting to wear the Polish crown himself or, at least, to exert a strong influence on its holder.43 This is what Czartoryski’s wife and mother-in-law believed. Their antipathy to Zamoyski was strengthened by his efforts to court Adam and Anna Czartoryski’s only daughter, Izabella. The Czartoryskis did have two sons, Witold and Władysław but neither was interested in inheriting the Polish crown and Adam Czartoryski’s relations with his elder son and heir apparent were difficult.44 Czartoryski’s personality may also have played a role. He has been described as an indecisive Hamlet-like figure, hampered by moral weakness and a chronically vacillating character which, according to his opponent, Joachim Lelewel, created an illusion of goodness.45 He was also ill-served in emigration by his long friendship with Alexander I and his earlier Russophilism, biographical facts that he sought to overcome by endorsing the visceral anti-Russianism of his compatriots in exile.46

For all these reasons, the most concrete attempt to make Poland a hereditary monarchy failed. Several decades later, when the Polish state was resurrected in the wake of the First World War, it was indeed headed by an authoritarian individual, Józef Piłsudski, who styled himself a naczelnik or leader (one avoids the term Führer) but not as king.47 Monarchy was thoroughly discredited, not so much because of the Czartoryski episode as because of its association with the hated partitioning powers. The revived Polish state adopted the name of its predecessor, the Rzeczpospolita, without endorsing the institutions of the First Rzeczpospolita, and it called itself the Second Rzeczpospolita. Notably, the Second Rzeczpospolita abolished all noble titles. After the interlude of the Polish People’s Republic, founded and supported by the Soviet Union and Polish communists after 1945, Poland proclaimed itself in 1990 the Third Rzeczpospolita. It is as a republic with an elected president that it continues to exist today.

Notes

1. The ‘Great Emigration’ has long been a favourite subject for Polish historians. See, for example, Lubomir Gadoń, Emigracja polska (Krakow: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1901–02), the most substantial of several of his works on the subject; more recently, Sławomir Kalembka, Wielka Emigracja. Polskie wychodzenie polityczne w latach 1831–1863 (Warsaw: Wiedza powszechna, 1971); as well as the book he edited, Wielka Emigracja i sprawa polska a Europa (1832–1864) (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1980); also, Alina Barszczewska-Krupa, Reformacja czy rewolucja: Koncepcje przekształcenia społeczeństwa polskiego w myśli politycznej Wielkiej Emigracji 1832–1863 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo lódzkie 1979); Stanisław Szostakowski, Z dziejów wielkiej emigracji (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo szkolne i pedagogiczne, 1991) and his other publication; as well as the numerous works by the recently deceased Jerzy Skowronek.


3. The partitions of Poland, undertaken by Russia, Prussia and Austria took place in 1772, 1793 (Austria did not participate in the second partition), and 1795.


5. The last of the hereditary dynasty of the Jagiellons died out at the end of the sixteenth century. Poland elected its monarchs thereafter until the final demise of the Commonwealth in 1795.

6. The szlachta was a peculiarly Polish conception, comparable only to its Hungarian counterpart rather than to the aristocracies of Western Europe, in that it included 8 to 10% of the population, much more than Western European aristocracies, and indicated status rather than titles, wealth or even land ownership. It was the szlachta that elected Polish monarchs and, as such, until the demise of the Polish state it was considered the ‘nation’. Szlachta, possibly from the German ‘Geschlecht’ has been variously translated as the ‘nobility’, the ‘equestrian order’, ‘Squirearchy’, or the ‘gentry’. The last term is probably the best translation.

7. Most prominent among the leaders of the left-wing of the Polish emigration was the historian and polymath, Joachim Lelewel (1796–1864) who believed that Poland had succumbed because of the egoism of the powerful
and that the renaissance of Poland would only be possible the day when differences among classes were abolished. For a biography translated into French, Marian Serejski, Joachim Lelewel: sa vie et son œuvre (Warsaw: Ossolineum, 1961). A biography available in English is Joan Skurnowicz, Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981).

8. Król, Konserwatyści a niepodległość, 67, argues that Czartoryski should not be seen as an exponent of the right-wing but as a centrist. Be that as it may, the individuals who elected Czartoryski as king definitely can be considered right-wing activists and in the hothouse climate of the Polish emigration the only division that counted was that between the ‘democrats’ on the left and the ‘monarchists’ on the right. The former believed in a future where Poland would be a republic based upon an emancipated peasantry, one where the people (lud) would be replaced by society (społecznicy) as Sławomir Kalembska has summarized the platform of the left-wing Gromady Ludu Polskiego in his contribution ‘Pojęcie narodu w publicystyce obozu demokratycznego Wielkiej Emigracji’ to Idee i Koncepcje narodu w polskiej myśli politycznej czasów porozbiorowych, ed. J. Gockowski and A. Walicki (Warsaw: AWN, 1977), 158. The conception of the right-wing was that of a future Polish kingdom where class distinctions would be maintained but classes would coexist in harmony. It is to this latter group that Czartoryski himself unquestionably belonged.

9. The ‘young group’ received this name not because of the age of its members but because most had only gravitated recently to the camp of Prince Czartoryski. The group headed by Władysław Zamoyski (about whom more later) included Feliks Breinański, Ludwik Bystrzanowski, Michał Czajkowski, Ludwik Orpiszewski, Narcyz Olizar, Janusz Woronicz.


11. There is considerable historiographical dispute as to Czartoryski’s attitude towards the crown that was offered him. On the one hand, he never accepted it. On the other hand, he did not condemn the gesture of those who had offered it to him. Kamil Dziewanowski, Książe wielkich nadziei; biografia księdza Adama Czartoryskiego (Wrocław: Ata 2, 1998), 155, writes that from time to time the prince protested against the kingly title but never did so very energetically. He never wore a crown but often appeared publicly in a red coat with ermine trimmings (perhaps considered a royal appanage?). It is true that Czartoryski’s attitude is not clear. On the one hand, he took his distance from the idea of king de facto but he showed a certain indulgence towards those ‘who necessarily want to listen but who do not see’. Maria Wierzbicka, ‘Myśl historyczna pisma Trzeci Maj’ (1839–1848), Przegląd Historyczny 82, no. 3/4 (1991): 411 also cites a speech by Czartoryski from 1839 where he describes ‘these people! i.e. the electors’ as foreign to him but he praises their courage. The most recent study, Mikołaj Rysiewicz, Monarchia, Lud, Religia monarchizm konserwatywnych środowisk politycznych wielkiej emigracji w latach 1831–1848 (Krakow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2015), 91, claims that Hanna Lutzwowa (cited below) believes Czartoryski was secretly behind the move to make himself king, citing her belief that Czartoryski made no objections to Janusz Woronicz’s polemical defence of the monarchial idea. In the same article she merely states that proclaiming Czartoryski king was not a ‘happy idea’ and that she had not found a single sign of Czartoryski’s acceptance of the monarchial title in all the archives she had perused. Hanna Lutzwowa, ‘Prasa emigracyjna obozu 3 maja (na marginesie pracy St Szostakowskiego-Z kart wielkiej emigracji. Prasa obozu arystokratyczno-konserwatywnego w latach 1832–1848)’, Przegląd historyczny 66, no. 4 (1975): 642–51. The most accepted position is taken by Marian Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity 1770–1861 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 220, who writes that Czartoryski refused to proclaim himself king and reacted with anger to the proposal but never publicly disavowed it. Ewa Ziółek, ‘Wielka Emigracja wobec Konstytucji 3 Maja’, Rocznik Lubelski 31–32 (1989/1990): 40 also believes the move to proclaim Czartoryski king was unsuccessful because of his opposition.

12. There are a number of biographies devoted to Czartoryski. The most authoritative one is the three-volume work by Marcelli Handelsman, Adam Czartoryski (Warsaw: Towarzystwo naukowe warszawskie, 1948) and ff. Also, Jerzy Skowronek, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1770–1861 (Warsaw: Wiedza powszechna, 1994). See too the book by Dziewanowski cited above.

13. The Constitution of 3 May 1791 preceded the French constitution of 3 September 1791 by a few months. The English translation of the Constitution published in the year of its adoption was entitled ‘New Constitution of the Government of Poland established by the Revolution’. What the English translator found revolutionary, no doubt, was the fact that the Constitution was adopted by ‘the grace of God and the will of the nation’.

14. Among the aspects of the Constitution criticized by the Left was the constitutional provision that ‘the holy Roman Catholic faith shall be the dominant national religion, the changing of it for any other persuasion is forbidden’ (even though it offered ‘peace and protection to all persuasions’). Whereas the king was willing to consider the demands of religious dissidents, apparently the Czartoryski brothers were opposed to this
opening. Stanislaw August Poniatowski also promised to marry a Catholic, John T. Alexander, *Catherine the Great: Life and Legend* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 127. In fact, he remained a bachelor to the end of his life. Furthermore, the Left criticized the fact that the Constitution did not state who enjoyed suffrage only that ‘the equestrian order [sic] is confirmed in its rights’. And, of course, the Constitution of 3 May transformed the elective monarchy not into a republic but into a hereditary monarchy. The only concession to the past was the phrase ‘we reserve to the nation, the right of electing to the Throne any other house or family after extinction of the first’. This also confirmed the hereditary nature of the throne.


17. The Kosciuszko Uprising of 1794 against Russia and Prussia had a radical democratic character which would not have pleased Czartoryski. On the other hand, Kosciuszko’s efforts to free Poland of foreign domination corresponded closely to Czartoryski’s aims.

18. A recent study gives this account of a conversation between Czartoryski and Alexander, sometime before 1796: the Polish Prince expressed the opinion that hereditary monarchy is the truly just and right form of government, to which Alexander, presumptive heir to the Russian throne, replied that, no, rulers ought to be elected by citizens of republics, and it is to toward republican government that the world must rightly progress. To this, his prisoner, the Polish Prince, retorted that this cannot be, for it was freedom of election that destroyed his Polish fatherland; it was the free election of Kings that so weakened Poland as to lead to her demise and dismemberment by Austria, Prussia and Russia. Alexander—future Tsar of Russia—grew passionate with anger. ‘The partition of Poland is one of the greatest crimes of the century! My grandmother—a German—has destroyed a Slavic kingdom in cooperation with Prussia! What need does Russia have for more land?? It is hard enough for us to rule what we already have! If I ever ascend to the throne, I will repay Poland this hideous and scandalous robbery! I will restore her freedom and restore the lands we have taken from Poland!’ Peter S. Rieth, ‘The Religious Imagination & the Republican Tsar, Alexander I’, *The Imaginative Conservative*, 27 November 2015. There are no sources given for this conversation.


22. Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*, 31 writes that Czartoryski was the first to relate the problem of lasting peace to the principle of nationality, to the idea of natural equilibrium and to political liberalism. Kukiel is referring to Czartoryski’s memoire of 1803 but his statement holds even more convincingly for his *Essai
It was, apparently, Czartoryski. In 1846, during an uprising in Galicia, the Monarchical-Insurrectionist Society called, yet again, for Czartoryski to lead the Uprising. See Feliks Brea's book, ‘The First Relevant Papal Encyclical; Mirari vos’, published in 1832, condemned the Polish insurrection for having contested legitimate authority. It was not until 1841, to Czartoryski's great joy, that the Holy See issued a criticism of tsarist Russia (for its repression of Greek Catholics).

Chapter 7 of the Constitution of 3 May entitled ‘The King, the Executive Authority’ read, in English translation, ‘No government, be it the most perfect, can stand without strong executive authority’.

The Constitution operated a sleight of hand in declaring that the throne of Poland shall be forever elective (Paris: Maulde & Renou, 1839), 39 and ff. Woronicz had been the leader of the movement at the ‘Société littéraire’ in Paris to declare Czartoryski king during the latter’s absence from Paris in early 1837.

Jerzy Skowronek, 'Koncepcja narodu w ideologii Hotelu Lambert i jej konfrontacja z bałkańską rzeczywistością', in Idee i Koncepcje narodu, 180. See also Paul Bryczynski, 'Prince Adam Czartoryski as a liminal figure in the development of modern nationalism in East Europe at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries', Nationalities Papers 38, no. 5 (2010): 647–69.

Quoted in Rysiewicz, Monarchia lud, religia, 91.

In 1846, during an uprising in Galicia, the Monarchical-Insurrectionist Society called, yet again, for Czartoryski to lead the Uprising. See Feliks Breański's book, ‘Adres towarzystwa insurrecyjno-monarchicznego Trzeciego Maja do jaśnie oświeconego xsięcia Adama Czartoryskiego’ (Paris: Maulde et Renou, 1846), 3–5. He declined. The uprising led to a massacre of Polish landowners by the peasantry, incited by Austrian authorities. During the crisis of 1848 Czartoryski again refused to order an uprising, judging the Hungarian and other events insufficient grounds for an insurrection in Poland in the absence of the involvement of friendly foreign states. Cadot, La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française, 498.

During the Crimean War, the Poles organized two legions fighting against Russia: a unit headed by Zamoyski and one led by Michal Czaikowski known later as Sadyk Pasha, a former agent of Czartoryski and novelist of the so-called ‘Cossack’ school who had converted to Islam to escape Russian demands for extradition. Zamoyski and Czaikowski quarrelled bitterly, reducing the impact of their moves in favour of Polish restoration. The anti-Russian motivation behind Polish participation on the side of Ottoman Turkey is obvious in the fact that preceding the Crimean War Polish emigrés had been in the forefront of self-determination movements among the Ottoman Sultan’s Balkan subjects. See the classic works by Marcelli Handelsman, Czartoryski, Nicolas Ier et la Question du Proche Orient (Paris: Pédone, 1934), and Ennio Di Nolfo, Adam J. Czartoryski et le congrès de Parisi; questione polacca e politica europea nel 1855–56 (Padua: Marsilio, 1964).
40. Konarska, *W kręgu hotelu Lambert*, 47 cites another *emigré*, the romantic poet and prose writer, Seweryn Goszczyński, who claims that Zamoyski, influential in the journal *Trzeci Maj* although not formally involved in its production, demanded that the editors suppress any statements that might be seen as tending in a democratic direction.

41. Quoted in Rysiewicz, *Monarchia, Lud, Religia*, 90. The origins of the expression are obscure but it is habitually attributed to Napoleon.

42. Although Karol Sienkiewicz was an early exponent of the monopolistic thesis he parted ways with the ‘young electors’ as did Karol Boromeusz Hoffman who had tried to demonstrate that hereditary monarchy was an old Slavonic institution and that ‘noble democracy’ only came into being through the influence of a feudal German spirit. Władysław Plater, a bona fide member of the Czartoryski camp called, in vain, for the prince to mark out his position compromised, as he put it, by the ‘dynastic dreams’ of those whom Czartoryski could have obliged to remain silent, Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 229.

43. The most complete work is Konarska, *W kręgu hotelu Lambert*. She confirms throughout the thesis that Zamoyski was a thoroughgoing reactionary. Czartoryski’s mother-in-law appears to have had scant regard for her son-in-law whom she called an old lunatic (stary wariat) and even less for Zamoyski, who happened to be her nephew, whom she called a madman (szaleniec), 25.

44. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 221.


46. Venceslas (Waclaw) Jablonowski, *La France et la Pologne, le slavianisme et la dynastie polonaise* (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1843) was a victim of the fears prevalent in the Polish emigration. Although he endorsed the idea of a national royal dynasty headed by Czartoryski he had the misfortune to criticize the West, particularly France, and he appeared ‘soft’ on Russian pretension to head a Slavic movement. For these sins he was roundly criticized by all camps within the emigration, both left and right, and he was excluded from the partisans of Czartoryski.

47. Naczelnik was a title first used by Kosciuszko, the leader of the 1794 uprising. It is currently applied to the head of the Polish scout movement. It was also applied to Czartoryski, after 1854, according to Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland: 1795–1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 154, though it was combatted as lacking continuity by those in favour of endowing Czartoryski with the royal title.

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