

Workshop Report

The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding

ASSESSING THE EFFECTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UN TARGETED SANCTIONS

October 1st- 3rd, 2009

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva, Switzerland

THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE | GENEVA

**CENTRE ON CONFLICT,
DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING**

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**OCTOBER 2009 WORKSHOP
REPORT**

**Thomas Biersteker
The Graduate Institute,
Geneva**

During the first few days of October 2009, more than thirty scholars (primarily political scientists, economists, and lawyers) and policy practitioners (from the UN and from individual Member States) met for three days at a workshop at the Graduate Institute, Geneva. The meeting involved individuals with extensive experience in the design, implementation, and analysis of UN targeted sanctions.

The purpose of the workshop was (1) to conduct a state of the art review of knowledge about the effects and effectiveness of multilateral targeted sanctions and (2) to develop a common research framework for a systematic and comprehensive analysis of all UN targeted sanctions since the measures were first introduced in the early 1990s.

The international consortium of scholars and practitioners assembled for the larger targeted sanctions research project of which this workshop was an integral part includes more than just the participants of the October 2009 workshop in Geneva. Six participants

were unable to attend the meeting, but prepared memoranda that were presented and discussed at the workshop. An additional sixteen individuals who were unable to attend and did not contribute a memorandum have indicated an interest in being associated with the international research consortium. A current list of consortium associates is included at the end of this report.

Since the meeting operated under the Chatham House rule, rather than attempt to provide a detailed chronology or summary of every point, this workshop report will distil some of the main points made at each session (without attribution), particularly those relevant to each session topic, and emphasize points of consensus that emerged during the course of the deliberations. The report follows the agenda of the meeting and concludes with an elaboration of the research architecture that was discussed extensively on the concluding day of the workshop. A separate document, updating the preliminary research design paper and elaborating on the research architecture discussed at the workshop, will be distributed separately.

Thursday October 1st, pm.

Introduction and Welcome

Thomas Biersteker welcomed the participants to the Graduate Institute, explained the purposes of the workshop, and began the introduction of participants.

How should we define Targeted Sanctions? How do Targeted Sanctions differ from Comprehensive Sanctions?

George Lopez, University of Notre Dame

Loraine Rickard-Martin, former United Nations Secretariat Officer, NY¹

Michael Brzoska, Hamburg University

Discussant: Benno Laggner, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

○ **Definitions**

Targeted sanctions are frequently defined in terms of what they are not: they are *not* comprehensive trade sanctions.

There is a broad range of targeted sanctions measures, ranging from highly targeted (and extremely limited) sanctions to measures that approximate comprehensive sanctions, such as sanctions against a sector (finance, petroleum products) widely used by an entire population. The scope of their effects matters significantly. For them to

¹ Throughout the report, individuals whose names appear in *italics* were not in attendance at the workshop, but the memos they prepared for the meeting were both presented and discussed.

be considered targeted, sanctions should be discriminating in some way.

It is important to keep a broad conception of targeted sanctions for the project, differentiating between sanctions against individuals, arms embargoes, and commodity bans.

Targeted sanctions are used for many contemporary threats to international peace and security: counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, peace enforcement, and human rights violations. All multilateral sanctions in place today are targeted sanctions (both UN and EU);

With regards to nomenclature, there was general consensus that it was time to drop the phrase “smart” sanctions.

○ **How targeted sanctions differ**

Targeted sanctions differ from comprehensive trade sanctions, but how they differ depends on the different types of targeted sanctions being considered: targeted financial sanctions against individuals and/or entities, travel bans against individuals, or limited sanctions such as sectoral or commodity bans. Arms embargoes are a special case of sectoral or commodity ban.

Targeted sanctions are discriminating and focus attention on a target and its (proscribed) activities, not on the entire population of a country.

At least in theory, targeted sanctions are flexible and can be adapted or respond to a target’s response, combined with positive incentives, or used to drive a wedge between factions in a given regime. By contrast,

comprehensive measures are blunt. Any adjustment or relaxation of comprehensive measures is often seen as an indication of a weakening of political will.

Targeted sanctions may require greater political will to be effective. They are more complex, more difficult to administer (because they have more potential points of intervention), and more difficult to implement (because they require more technical capabilities). Because of their complexity, targeted sanctions may be more *difficult to measure and evaluate*.

Although they are intended to minimize general humanitarian consequences, all sanctions, even targeted measures, have some humanitarian consequences, both for targets, and for the non-targeted population.

Targeted sanctions have gone from being perceived initially as normatively desirable to increasingly being perceived in negative terms. Because of the recent concern with the absence of due process, there is a growing political problem with targeted sanctions.

The record in the use and effectiveness of targeted sanctions has been mixed.

Friday October 2nd, am.

How are Targeted Sanctions Supposed to Work (both in theory and in practice)?

Francesco Giumelli, Metropolitan University, Prague

Risa Brooks, Northwestern University

David Sylvan, The Graduate Institute, Geneva

Peter Wallensteen, Uppsala University

Discussant: Jay Sutterlin, UN Secretariat

The purpose of this session was to explore *how* targeted sanctions are intended to work. While there are many similarities between comprehensive and targeted sanctions, many analysts apply theories about sanctions in general to targeted sanctions, without any adaptation or reflection on how targeted sanctions might work differently.

The goals or purposes of sanctions vary: they may be designed to (1) change behaviour (to coerce), (2) constrain behaviour (to constrain), and/or (3) send a signal (to signal).

Purpose 1: Coercion

The goal is to make the target do something

- Success can be measured by whether there is a change in behavior, or one policy option becomes more appealing to the target
- Often accompanied by other policy instruments (such as a threat of intervention); targeted sanctions cannot be considered in isolation

Purpose 2: Constraint

The goal is to prevent the target from doing something

- Success can be measured by whether the target's ability to do something is weakened and/or its related costs are raised
- Delaying the target's progress on a proscribed activity is evidence of constraint

Purpose 3: Signaling

The goal is to send a signal or some message to an external audience

- Success can be determined if message or signal is sent, delivered, and received.
- Which audience? Signaling is multiple and may simultaneously involve signaling to a target, signaling (and thereby deterring) supporters of a target, signaling domestic audiences in the sender state, and/or signaling a global audience).
- Signaling may be used for window-dressing or deception

Not all sanctions are the same. They vary in their *feasibility* (determined by their degree of acceptability of sender's demands by target and their preciseness) and by their degree of *enforcement* (determined by both implementation and monitoring).

Sending a signal generally has low enforcement costs, but either high or low feasibility (depending on the case); coercion and constraint tend to have higher enforcement costs, but their feasibility tends to vary from low (in the case of coercion) to relatively higher (in the case of constraint).

In the case of targeted sanctions, precisely who gets targeted is

important: the targeted elites may not actually be decision-makers.

A detailed knowledge of the domestic political economy is vital; you need to know who exercises authority: policy decision-makers, economic and political elites, or influential people? This requires taking into account target characteristics in order to estimate potential effects of targeted sanctions. It is important to analyze both the winners and the losers from targeted sanctions.

Targeted sanctions fail when there are minimal costs, or even gains, for those in positions of influence.

The effects of sanctions vary over time. Analysis requires inter-temporal analysis of sanctions – e.g. by episode (see section on methods, below).

Targeted sanctions add a social stigma to economic pressure. The psychological effects of targeted sanctions may be as or even more important than the economic effects. Do not underestimate the social stigma associated with being designated.

If they are to work as punishment, targeted sanctions must signal deviance to the target. (This idea goes back to the origins of sanctions in the League of Nations.)

Sanctions signaling deviance to the target should present a "reference group" for appropriate or "correct" behaviour and clarify the conditions under which sanctions will be ended ("reintegration").

This means that sanctions must be clear and also flexible enough to react

quickly to target behavioural changes. This may be hard to achieve for multilateral sanctions and the bureaucracies responsible for implementing them. It calls for examining examples of sanctions removal in greater depth.

There are different mechanisms in targeting individuals and targeting commodities.

Empirical studies of target behavior in cases of sanctions targeted against individuals indicate that almost none change their behaviour, and at least 1 in 6 tries to evade them (certainly at the outset).

Often, those targeted were not the actual policy or decision-makers, but the lower echelons; there is an issue of non-optimal targeting. Those targeted are not necessarily individuals with heavy dependence on international, worldly lifestyles. Who is influenced by sanctions is more important than the number of people affected.

Sanctions design is a key issue; senders must realize that *one size does not fit all*.

Human Rights (HR) concerns and monitoring issues devalue the instrument of individual targeting. The longer the list, the more united the list of targets is likely to become.

It is important to try to anticipate the effects of targeted sanctions. At times, there may be a trade off between crafting effective sanctions and sending a strong (unanimous) signal from the UN Security Council.

Swift imposition of targeted sanctions and rapid review are both important,

especially as the target behavior or situation changes.

Signaling strength may be linked to UN Security Council voting patterns: the more unanimity, the more strength. The same is true for cost to sender: the more cost, the more strength of the sanctions.

It is difficult to devise a coherent theory of targeted sanctions. We should look at different types of sanctions and the levels of effectiveness for each category.

How to Evaluate Sanctions-1: Measuring the Effects of Sanctions

Peter Romaniuk, City University of New York

Clara Portela, Singapore Management University

Rico Carisch, former member of the UN panel of experts on the Sudan, NY

Discussant: Paul Bentall, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London

The purpose of this session was to try to go beyond the pain/gain argument associated with comprehensive sanctions (the more painful they are, the more likely they are to lead to the intended results). How can we distinguish between the different objectives of targeted sanctions? We need to *differentiate the effects* of sanctions on targets *from the effectiveness* of targeted sanctions as a policy instrument. It is probably easier to distinguish between the effects and effectiveness of sanctions when the principal objective of the measures is to signal or coerce. It is more difficult when the principal objective of the sanctions is to constrain behaviour; what are the effects of targeted sanctions? On what do they depend?

Different senders have different intentions and the intentions of senders may evolve over time.

It is important to disaggregate the sender states internally.

There are different ways of measuring effects – one can use cost calculations (were sanctions cost-efficient for the sender?) or amounts of political dissent generated by sanctions.

Look at unintended consequences (considered below) and their interplay with intended consequences.

The “effects” and “success” of targeted sanctions are inversely related to motive complexity of targets and senders. The more complex the motives of targets, the harder it is to measure the success of the measures.

Try to design sanctions to remove or inhibit the profit gains of sanctions evaders in the private sector. The “comprehensiveness” and “enforcement” of targeted sanctions is key. Targeted sanctions are most effective when they encompass all private and public actors in a given sector, i.e. all captured and all alternatives (e.g. internationally) blocked and all of this monitored. Many targeted sanctions regimes do not do this well.

Targeted sanctions can also be effective when they economically discourage other states and international actors from interacting with the targets.

There should be systematic efforts to try to measure the stigmatization and ostracism associated with targeted

sanctions. The effects are not only economic.

Sanctions effects are multidimensional: there are factors that can be measured (numbers, assets, guns); sender intentions and whether they were fulfilled; the diplomatic effort made; changes that were made to adjust the sanctions regime (change of signals); relationships between UNSC members and between the Council members and the target; and behavioural changes of the target.

Most government effort goes into getting sanctions imposed and in maintaining them; they are rarely modified.

We should not assume that the effects of sanctions are related to why they were imposed. All states are composed of politicians and bureaucracies, under pressure to do something. *Sanctions are means-driven, not aim-driven.* They are imposed, because they are available to be used.

It is important to consider the effects of the threat of sanctions. Sanctions may have effects on targets even before they are imposed.

Although they are often closely inter-related, it is important not to conflate discussions of the effects or impacts of targeted sanctions with assessments of the effectiveness of sanctions.

There are both direct and indirect effects of sanctions. *Direct effects* include reductions in a target’s access to finance, ability to travel, access to arms, ability to use natural resources to support a conflict. *Indirect effects* include general reductions in foreign

investment, international trade, or the flow of aid.

Friday October 2nd, pm.

I-How to Evaluate Sanctions-2: Measuring the Effectiveness of Sanctions

Kimberly Elliott, Center for Global Development, Washington
Detlef Sprinz, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
Jean-Louis Arcand, The Graduate Institute, Geneva

Discussant: Christopher Yvon, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London

Evaluating the effectiveness of targeted sanctions is perhaps the most difficult challenge conceptually, analytically, and methodologically. What are the appropriate metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of targeted sanctions? A literal reading of the stated goals of a UN Security Council resolution (and the conditions under which sanctions might be lifted) is likely to lead one to the conclusion that targeted sanctions are never effective, for they rarely, if ever, achieve all of the objectives as stated in the original resolution. Even the examples of sanctions “success” are likely to be the product of face-saving compromises that go only part of the way toward satisfying the conditions articulated in the original resolution. What, therefore, are the appropriate metrics for determining the effectiveness of targeted sanctions?

The goals of targeted sanctions are multiple, and the different goals must be identified.

Sanctions send a signal, and the decision not to impose a sanction also sends a signal. Even the degree of attention (or inattention) to their implementation are signals. The policy question is whether a weak signal is better than no action at all.

One indicator of effectiveness is that the *costs to the sanctioned party* should be greater than the costs to the sender.

Targeted sanctions are not likely to be effective if regime change is the goal (note this relates to the point about feasibility made in the session on how targeted sanctions are supposed to work).

Effectiveness is composed of two aspects: (1) change in behaviour and (2) the contribution of the sanctions to the change in behaviour (without imposing excessive damage to civilians).

Effectiveness of targeted sanctions is determined by the *proximity of actual performance* of a target (compliance) to some optimal point of effectiveness, located on a linear spectrum between the counterfactual situation of not having sanctions and some optimal point of effectiveness.

For targeted sanctions to work there must be incomplete information. The target must underestimate the potency of the sanctions, the sender’s determination to impose them, or incorrectly believe that sanctions will be imposed, no matter what the target does. In addition, the target’s miscalculation should be corrected once the sanctions are imposed.

There are two stages in gauging sanctions effectiveness: (1) the *threat*

stage and (2) the *imposition* stage. The interplay of these stages generates predictions of whether sanctions will work at all. Targets yield only if they underestimated sender's resolve to sanction.

Impact evaluation (and therefore an assessment of the sanctions' effects and their effectiveness) requires counterfactual reasoning. We need to try to figure out what would have happened in a country if there had been no sanctions. We want to compare countries that are as similar as possible with and without sanctions.

There are three *sources of bias* common to impact evaluation: first, endogeneity or problems of attribution (the chicken versus the egg); second, expectations that sanctions will have an impact (particularly given the type of countries against which sanctions are typically applied); and third, correlation between the impacts of sanctions.

Methods to address these sources of bias include controlling for as many factors as possible and comparing different country periods with and without targeted sanctions (least squares matching), examining countries before and after the sanctions have been imposed (interrupted time series / regression discontinuity technique), and identifying factors that affect the imposition of sanctions but not their effects, and therefore identifying these effects indirectly through the fact that targeted sanctions have been imposed (instrumental variables technique).

Most targeted sanctions simultaneously have multiple goals. It will be difficult to separate them analytically.

The idea of breaking sanctions down into different episodes (discussed below) for comparison is very helpful, as is the distinction between threat and imposition of sanctions.

Qualitative data can be evaluated with the use of scaling techniques.

Threatening a target's expectations about the future may be more effective than the immediate impacts of sanctions when attempting to change target behaviour, but this is difficult to measure.

Modeling preference change on the part of targets (and senders) also complicates the analysis of effectiveness and has implications for research design.

It is important to distinguish effects from effectiveness. *Strong effects do not necessarily lead to effectiveness.*

II-Situating Targeted Sanctions in Broader Contexts (diplomatic and institutional)

Andrea Charron, Carleton University
Joseph Stephanides, former UN Secretariat official, NY
Christine Lee, Al Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee Monitoring Team, UN, NY

Discussant: Maria Telalian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece

Everyone recognizes that sanctions are rarely, if ever, imposed in isolation. They are only one set of policy measures, employed in the context of the implicit or explicit threat of the use of force, ongoing diplomatic negotiations, and other initiatives by

both public actors like the International Criminal Court and private initiatives like the Kimberley Process.

UN sanctions have been imposed in four different kinds of situations: interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, against so-called rogue states, and against non-state actors supporting terrorism.

- Interstate: only a few cases (Armenia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia), of which Iraq and Serbia are outliers
- Intrastate cases: nearly 20 cases, about half of them in Africa; usually some breaking event that upset the peace and prompted sanctions by the SC to restore the status quo *ante*
- Rogue states (norm-breakers): nightmare case for sanctions, aim to isolate until behaviour changes. Employed for human rights violations, NPT violations, and counter-terrorism (harbouring terrorist organizations) Sanctions are sometimes used to keep parties at bargaining table
- Non-state actors: primarily counter-terrorism cases

Targeted sanctions should not be over-used, but once imposed, they should be implemented forcefully. There should be more attention to the threat of targeted sanctions as a deterrence measure.

All sanctions regimes entail multiple institutional actors. An issue like countering terrorism, for instance, involves multiple institutions; in addition to the UN Security Council committees, the FATF, UNODC, INTERPOL, etc.

Sanctions and diplomacy: targeted sanctions should be considered in conjunction with normal diplomatic activity.

The political context is very important; political will to implement and support of key member states (particularly among the P-5) is often vital. Much comes back to political will, enforcement, and monitoring. The more you ask at the UN Security Council level in terms of mandate, the more difficult it is to get consensus on the Council. What do you do if there is no political will? How do you resolve competing political agendas?

Coordination of international institutional activities can be problematic. While some international organizations can be complementary and useful in implementing targeted sanctions, questions about the desirability of asking peacekeeping forces to take on sanctions enforcement persist. Some argue that enforcement is inherently a Member State responsibility. As a practical matter, the expert groups associated with a UN sanctions committee would not talk to the staff of the International Criminal Court. They have different mandates and different standards of evidence or documentation required for taking their respective measures.

Another aspect of coordination relates to timing. How do you sequence targeted sanctions in the context of what the other players in a conflict are doing – states, IOs, and different combinations of incentives and threats they use?

As a research design issue, take a close look at the paragraphs in the preamble

of UN Security Council resolutions. They often contain insights on coordination issues.

Saturday October 3rd, am.

I-Externalities of Targeted Sanctions: Positive and Negative Consequences

Mikael Eriksson, Swedish Defense Research Institute
Andrea Bianchi, The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Neta Crawford, Boston University

Discussant: Abdul Omar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada

Sanctions do have *unintended consequences* (positive and negative) and externalities, but there are few systematic data to substantiate or test this (as yet).

When sanctions are imposed, targets can evade, and in any rate, the effects of sanctions kick in rather slowly, even if the measures are imposed quickly. In addition, the political will of different senders may diverge.

There are different types of externalities:

- Externalities to targets: human rights infringements, economic effects (unemployment, decline in foreign investment, increased levels of migration)
- Externalities to senders: anti-sanctions propaganda, economic consequences, dialogue inhibited because of sanctions
- Externalities to third parties: cost of implementation, political costs, social costs, dissociation and economic effects

Impacts on targets vary by sanctions type:

- Arms embargoes: criminalizes some groups, which can change the economic profile of the state targeted
- Economic sanctions (sectoral): can lead to displacement from targeted sector due to job losses, can foster illicit sectors (prostitution, black market), or produce economic decline, generating greater poverty
- Travel sanctions: omitted except for effects on spouses and children (and for individuals with the same name, the problem of false positives)

If a clear picture of all these externalities can be obtained, what then is the threshold level after which they become unacceptable?

What are the legal constraints on actions taken by the UN Security Council? The Council seems to have the sense that it can, and will, impose sanctions – a sense of collective power and authority (“paper truth”, “excessive self-confidence”); what are the legal constraints on (or limits to) actions taken by the UN Security Council?

Implementation of Council mandates like targeted sanctions requires Member State implementation; there is an enormous potential for collision with the domestic legal order. The same is true for other international regimes and norms: human rights, international courts.

This clash of legal cultures is unintended and unexpected, but systemically caused and not unforeseeable. It is striking that so few

have raised questions about the issue of jurisdictional immunity for targeted heads of state or high ranking officials.

Targeted sanctions were initially hailed as a more nuanced, and fairer instrument (in contrast to comprehensive sanctions).

They are intended to be discriminating, yet can be indiscriminating in their effects.

South Africa case illustrates both intended and unintended consequences:

- Arms embargo: created domestic substitution industry and even nuclear programme, which later became bargaining chips for lifting the sanctions
- Trade and oil embargoes: failed because frequently evaded
- Created black markets and strengthened a military complex that made democracy more difficult, foreign policy, and economy/poverty problematic

These were comprehensive sanctions. Would targeted sanctions have worked better? And would they have been more ethical?

n ethical terms, targeted sanctions should be preferred to comprehensive sanctions, yet they have significant unintended effects. The positive effects of targeted sanctions, whether intended or not, should be balanced against the negative unintended consequences/externalities.

Unintended consequences have both a negative and positive dimension. From a sender's perspective, there are potentially significant positive

implications for international human rights and humanitarian law. Think of the mass violations of the rights of civilians caught in conflict zones. It is important to give equal attention to both sides of the equation. Liberia and Sierra Leone have wanted the sanctions maintained because they provide stabilizing effects.

Is isolation still a legitimate aim of targeted sanctions, or does the attempt to isolate a regime only make things worse? It is rarely the exclusive aim, but is related to an incentive to persuade a norm violator to "return to the fold". Disincentives for such a move may be created by the domestic consequences of targeted sanctions.

Positive impacts in countering the financing of terrorism have, apart from HR violations, made a major improvement to strengthening the system (the ability of private financial actors to implement and monitor restrictive measures), also with long-term implications.

Whether unintended consequences are considered "*positive*" or "*negative*" is often in the eye of the beholder and may well change over time. It is not evident that this is such a useful distinction to make.

II-Research Design²

Thomas Biersteker, *The Graduate Institute, Geneva*

Sue Eckert, *The Watson Institute, Brown University*

Mikael Eriksson, *Swedish Defense Research Institute*

² This summary contains some elements from both sessions on research design

The discussion of the design of research for the group consortium was introduced as a relatively “rare” phenomenon. It is rare because scholars seldom work collaboratively in large numbers in the social sciences, and they tend to be competitive and highly critical of each other’s work. It is also rare that the discussion of methods is conducted with potential financial supporters in the room. It is a bit like learning how sausage is made with the customer watching, but is done in this context both for purposes of enhancing transparency and bringing policy practitioners into the design of the research project at the ground level, to ensure the outcomes resonate with the concerns of both the scholarly and policy communities.

What is the universe of cases? Should we limit ourselves to Chapter VII UN Security Council cases – country-based instances in which targets have been identified by the UN? There was a consensus that Chapter VII UN Security Council cases should form the core of our analysis, but we should be open to consideration of other multilateral cases, particularly those from regional organizations like the OAS, EU, and AU. They are certainly part of the larger institutional context in many instances.

The list of likely UN cases includes Somalia, Libya, Liberia, Haiti (the targeted portions), UNITA (Angola), Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia (again the targeted portions only), Sudan, Sierra Leone, Al Qaida and the Taliban (Afghanistan), Iraq (1518), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon/Syria (1636), DRC, DPRK, and Iran. Myanmar and Zimbabwe are two

important non-UN cases we might consider.

What is the unit of analysis? The idea of adopting and adapting the concept of a sanctions “episode” appeared to have wide backing. The challenge is determining in general terms how to define a sanctions episode. Should it be based on decisions taken by the senders or in more relational terms, periods of discernibly different relationships between senders and targets? It will be important to establish precisely when different episodes start and end. Changes over time can be included by incorporating a number of different episodes per case, which also increases the sample size for comparative analysis. The definition of episode will probably have to be adapted to different cases. Different cases may have different numbers of episodes. Nonetheless, we need a non-arbitrary way of defining an “episode.”

In the construction of episodes, the period before sanctions were first imposed, the period in which sanctions were threatened (either explicitly or implicitly) should also be examined (don’t begin case chronologies with the onset of sanctions). We also need to consider lags in implementation. Targets may not react until the targeted sanction is implemented, not when the UN Security Council first acts.

The scale of the research enterprise is likely to vary significantly across the different country cases. Some (Somalia) cover a long and extended period of time, in contrast to others that are relatively more recent (Iran). Some are fairly focused in their purpose and list of targets (Lebanon/Syria), while others involve changing purposes and an ever

expanding universe of targets (al Qaida/Taliban).

There was a fair amount of discussion about the importance of trying to ensure that the output of the project includes both a practical guide and capacity building activities (which the larger project proposal calls for). The Security Council keeps designing sanctions regimes without an assessment of their likely effectiveness; new members come on board all the time and they have little knowledge of how sanctions regimes have changed over time or how sanctions are developed. Each of the cases should consider how lessons learned might help or hinder the UN's ability to adopt targeted sanctions in other situations.

It is important to incorporate third party change into the analysis of the course of different cases over time (i.e. the AU lifting of sanctions against Libya prior to the lifting of UN sanctions). With regard to analyzing the larger strategic context, P5 action beyond the context of the UN should be assessed.

We might also want to break the analysis of different cases transversally, into functional categories, across different types of sanctions. Arms embargoes, for example, tend not to change much over time and are therefore more like a single play game than other types of targeted sanctions (like targeted financial sanctions) that approximate iterated, multiple play games. Cases should be analyzed by different teams of analysts, to ensure inter-coder decisions and checks on reliability.

The objectives of sanctions should be clear from the outset; is signaling independent of the other goals of targeted sanctions? Probably yes, if no material impact is observable. Look at both documents with statements of goals and the use of signaling as a means to an end. Annual committee reports (and expert group reports) can be used to track the course of different sanctions regimes.

Conduct a pilot study as a guide to the larger collaborative research project. Try out the different measurement ideas. Measurement has at least two dimensions: orientation of policy as basis (what must be done) and degree of political will (strength of the sanctions).

Every case should identify counterfactual cases for comparative analysis: simulations, historical counterfactuals, or interrupted time series models should all be considered. You need to have a control group for any kind of impact analysis. If you don't have a baseline, or a counterfactual (cases with no sanctions, but otherwise similar), you will not be able to conduct a study of impacts. Keep in mind that targets and senders are likely to have different metrics. Make sure that each case contains a consideration of origins: what was the incident or actions that prompted UN Security Council attention in the first place?

We should think of the universe of cases as a continuum; some are narrowly targeted, while others are not; some are clearly more successful than others. In the end, the project should be able to answer some, if not all, of the following questions:

- When are targeted sanctions most effective?
- What do we know systematically about the effects, unintended consequences, and best conditions for the application of targeted sanctions?
- What are the most important elements of the larger strategic context?
- How can we operationalize political will?
- How can we differentiate between direct and indirect impacts of targeted sanctions?

Saturday October 3rd, pm.

Further Discussion of the Research architecture: What elements should every case include?

Background context to conflict (general context); identify what incidents prompted the initial idea to take some action; when was conflict first perceived and people began to focus on the topic.

Determination of the start of the string of episodes (when sanctions first threatened, implicitly or explicitly); the beginning of the sanction is not when the UNSC passes a resolution, but when a signal or threat is first given.

Identification of the principal goal or goals of the sanctions (try to determine whether sanctions are designed to have a material impact); note this has to be done for each episode identified, since the goals of sanctions change over time.

Identification of the different audiences for signaling.

Assessment of the amount of political will present at time of decision to impose sanction.

Exploration of the relationship(s) between the UN sanctions and actions taken by other bodies (ICC, IAEA, informal multi-party talks, regional actors, unilateral measures, individual P5 members); pay attention to positive incentives offered to targeted parties by major powers.

Identification of principal episodes; the cases have to be viewed as moving targets, on a regular basis, as resolutions and reports are adopted and introduced.

Assessment of implementation by principal trading partners and neighbouring states.

Differentiation between direct and indirect impacts (and separation of impacts (direct, indirect, and unintentional) from measures of effectiveness; include attempts to measure stigmatization; identify both winners and losers from targeted sanctions.

Identification of principal unintended consequences (both positive and negative).

Evaluation of when and how sanctions were lifted (this may be contained implicitly in some of the later episodes).

Assessments of effectiveness or policy outcomes, differentiated by different categories of goals (coerce, constrain, signal) and located on a continuum starting from one end (meeting the terms as stated in the UNSCRs), to approximating the core goals as originally articulated, to face saving measures taken by both sides to accommodate, to intransigence at the other end of the continuum. This should be undertaken at different

points in time (i.e., imagine a 2 or 3 dimensional space for each discussion of effectiveness). Another element of effectiveness involves consideration of sanctions in relation to other policy alternatives. An assessment of the sanctions contribution to the policy outcomes must also be undertaken (in the least, some evidence of impact and even better, acknowledgement by the targets).

Identification and/or selection of paired counterfactual case(s) (control group of cases with similar dimensions, but non-sanctioned = non-cases, or controls); consider drawing on the conflict data base as a source for different control cases

The workshop concluded with a preliminary discussion of who might take the lead in and/or participate in the different teams that will be assembled to conduct the case-based research. There was also a discussion of next steps and plans for future meetings, the first of which will be convened at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in the US in February 2010.

Workshop Participants

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Andrea Bianchi, *Graduate Institute, Geneva*
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Risa Brooks, *Northwestern University*
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Christine Lee, *Al Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team, UN, New York*
George Lopez, *University of Notre Dame, USA*
Julian Lübbert, *Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Germany*
Abdul Omar, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada*
Clara Portela, *Singapore Management University, Singapore*

Loraine Rickard-Martin, *former Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Secretariat, New York*
Peter Romaniuk, *City University of New York*
Daniela Schneider, *Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland*
Detlof Sprinz, *Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany*
David Sylvan, *Graduate Institute, Geneva*
Joseph Stephanides, *former Head of the Sanctions Unit, Department of Political Affairs, UN Secretariat, New York*
Jay Sutterlin, *UN Secretariat, New York*
Maria Telalian, *Foreign Ministry of Greece*
Frank van Beuningen, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, The Hague*
Christopher Yvon, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London*
Peter Wallensteen, *Uppsala University, Sweden*

**Student Rapporteurs and/or observers
(Graduate Institute, Geneva)**

Elena Gadjanova
Georg von Kalckreuth
Amber Khalid
Sonal Marwah
Jean-René Oettli
Olivier Schmitt-Navarin
Karin Sun
Bilyana Tsvetkova

Individuals who could not attend the first workshop and did not write a memo, but indicated an interest in being involved in future activities:

Peter Andreas, *Brown University*
David Baldwin, *Columbia University*
Alix Boucher, *Stimson Center, Washington*
Jane Boulden, *Royal Military College, Canada*
Thomas Cargill, *Chatham House, London*

Simon Chesterman, *NYU School of Law, Singapore*
David Cortright, *Notre Dame University*
Margaret Doxey, *University of Trent, Canada*
Vera Gowlland, *The Graduate Institute, Geneva*
E.J. (Ernst) Hogendoorn, *Princeton University, USA*
Jon Hovi, *University of Oslo*
Jonathan Kirshner, *Cornell University*
Eric Rosand, *Center for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, New York*
Alex Vines, *Chatham House, London*
Joanna Wechsler, *Security Council Report, New York*
Teresa Whitfield, *Center on International Cooperation, NYU*

About the Workshop report

This report marks the end of the second phase of a four-phase, four-year research project that seeks to conduct a systematic, comprehensive, multi-national study of the effects and effectiveness of UN multilateral targeted sanctions: "Evaluating the Effects and Effectiveness of Multilateral Targeted Sanctions". Targeted sanctions are increasingly utilized by the UN Security Council for a variety of peace and security objectives, yet at the same time, are challenged by a number of states and non-governmental organizations with regard to their effectiveness, as well as their effects on individual human rights. This project assesses the instrument of targeted sanctions and conducts a comprehensive analysis of the experience with the measures since they were first introduced by the UN Security Council in 1992 .

The project is hosted at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP). It is directed by Thomas J. Biersteker, the Curt Gasteyer Professor of International Security and Conflict Studies at the Graduate Institute, in collaboration with Sue Eckert, Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

The CCDP is a research centre of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It aims to offer policy relevant research built upon strong academic foundations on a variety of themes and issues, including: peacebuilding and reconciliation; post-conflict transitions and state-building; armed violence and development; and multi-stakeholder initiatives and the politics of monitoring and evaluation. The CCDP also participates in and supports a variety of outreach initiatives, including training modules, lectures and briefings, publications and other activities designed to disseminate the fruits of its research projects to relevant stakeholders beyond the academic community.

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